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Employment Protection and Gender
Dysphoria: Legal Definitions of
Unequal Treatment on the Basis
of Sex and Disability
By STUART A. WEIN*
CYNTHIA LARK REMMERS**
Nothing is more inflexible than what has never been defined but has
been taken for granted. With definitions one can argue, with as-
sumptions one cannot. No one knows that better-or has learned
this more painfully-than the transsexual.
J. Hoenig, M.D.1
Over the past fifteen years there has been a growing recognition of
the need to legally protect citizens from the effects of employment dis-
crimination. Congress has enacted comprehensive legislation protect-
ing vulnerable classes of people from discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 Many states have fol-
lowed with their own statutory schemes. 3 There remains, however, a
small group of individuals-individuals afflicted with gender dysphoria
syndrome 4-who have been afforded no right to pursue a legal remedy
* B.A., 1968, University of California at Berkeley; J.D., 1971, Harvard Law School.
Instructor, Hastings College of the Law. Member, California Bar.
** A.B., 1968, University of California, Davis. Member, Second Year Class, Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall.
1. Hoenig, The Legal Position of the Transsexual: Mostly Unsatisfactory Outside
Sweden, CAN. MED. A.J., Feb. 5, 1977, at 319 [hereinafter cited as Hoenig].
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975). A limited version of this protection is afforded handicapped individuals as
well. See notes 246-310 & accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 169-73 & accompanying text infra.
4. "Gender dysphoria syndrome" is a generic term increasingly applied in the medical
profession to those persons who express various forms of "displeasure with the sex of their
genital anatomy, the chromosomes, and the endocrine secretions." Laub & Fisk, A Rehabili-
tative Programfor Gender Dysphoria Syndrome by Surgical Sex Change, 53 PLASTIC & RE-
CONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 388, 390-91 (19741 [hereinafter cited as Laub & Fisk]. The
syndrome also may be referred to as "gender identity disorder." See AMERICAN PSYCHIAT-
RIC ASs'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS L:I (III Draft
1978) [hereinafter cited as APA DRAFT]. The syndrome includes, in addition to the classic
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in this area.
This Article contends that gender dysphoric persons who have al-
ready borne the psychological and social stigma of their condition,
should bear no special legal burden because of a sexual characteristic
having no relation to their ability to perform and contribute. Judicial
and administrative recognition of the transsexual person's employment
rights can exist in a context protective of the employer's legitimate con-
cerns for its economic enterprise.
The object of this Article is to examine the modes by which the
judicial system has reacted to claims made by aggrieved transsexual
employees. The judicial struggle with dilemmas of medicolegal defini-
tions will be analyzed as background to critical employment discrimi-
nation cases. Alternative interpretations of existing rules and
pronouncements will be examined and potential models for future em-
ployment protection will be formulated.
Background
Gender dysphoria syndrome, and transsexualism 5 in particular,
has been described thoroughly in the medical literature. 6 In the
transsexual, those effeminate male homosexuals, virilistic female homosexuals, or transves-
tites who occasionally, and for a variety of reasons, request sex reassignment surgery.
Walker, Transexualism, in SEX AND THE LIFE CYCLE 141-42 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Walker]. There is considerable medical controversy, however, regarding the classification of
gender dysphoric individuals; some professionals suggest that all disorders are on a contin-
uum while others attempt to create typologies. In spite of the technical differences, the terms
"gender dysphoria" and "transsexualism" will be used interchangeably in this Article. Un-
less otherwise specified, the terms will be used to describe both a preoperative and postoper-
ative individual.
5. Although it is cautioned that revisions may be necessary, "a currently acceptable
definition of transsexualism is that it is a disturbance of gender identity in which the person
manifests, with constant and persistent conviction, the desire to live as a member of the
opposite sex, and progressively takes steps to live in the opposite sex role on a full-time
basis." Money & Gaskin, Sex Reassignment, 9 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 249, 266 (1970-71). See
also Walker, supra note 4, at 142 (commenting on Money's definition as useful but ideal-
ized); Money & Walker, Counseling the Transexual, in HANDBOOK OF SEXOLOGY 1289
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Money & Walker].
6. See, e.g., H. BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON (1966); E. DE SAVITSCH,
HOMOSEXUALITY, TRANSVESTISM AND CHANGE OF SEX (1958): J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT,
MAN AND WOMAN, BOY AND GIRL (1972); PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERDISCIPLINARY SYM-
POSIUM ON GENDER DYSPHORIA SYNDROME (P. Gandy & D. Laub eds. 1974); TRANSSEXU-
ALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Green & Money]. The medical aspects of the syndrome also have been reported by legal
commentators. See, e.g., Belli, Transsexual Surgery. A New Tort?, 239 J.A.M.A. 2143, 2144
(1978); Note, .4 Legal Conundrum-Transsexuals in Athletics, I COMM/ENT 369 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Transsexuals in Athletics]; Comment, M. T v. T.- An Enlightened Per-
spective on Transsexualism, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 403, 404-10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as An
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transsexual individual, the dissonance between psychologic gender and
anatomic sex is frequently thought to produce at an early age a painful
sense of being trapped in the wrong body. Therapy aimed at other
than sex reassignment has consistently failed,7 rendering suicide a real
risk.8  Further, medical science has long distinguished transsexuality
from homosexuality and transvestism.9 The homosexual person char-
acteristically has no gender conflict; sex reassignment in such a person
would be harmful rather than therapeutic. Similarly, most transvestites
are satisfied psychologically with their anatomic sex, although they
achieve gratification from cross-dressing.
Transsexual people, then, suffer from a distinct gender disorder of
Enlightened Perspective]; Comment, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a
Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REv. 288, 288-94 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A Faltering
Response]; Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL
L. REV. 963, 963-79 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Transsexualism]; Note, Transsexuals in
Limbo: The Searchfor a Legal Defnition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REv. 236, 236-38 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Transsexuals in Limbo]; Comment, Transsexuals in Search of LegalAcceptance:
The Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 331, 334-38 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test]. Similar descriptions appear
in legal decisions. See, e.g., G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978).
7. "Any discussion of the treatment of transsexualism and the current status of the
change of sex operation must begin with one simple fact. Psychotherapy has notproved help-
ful in allowing the transsexual to accept that gender identity which is consistent with his genital
anatomy." Pauly, The Current Status of the Change of Sex Operation, 147 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 460, 465 (1968) (emphasis in original) (citing 19 sources for the state-
ment). This conclusion was recently confirmed by two psychiatrists who suggest, however,
that conscientious psychotherapy may benefit the gender dysphoric who is not a "true
transsexual." Kirkpatrick & Friedmann, Treatment of Requestsfor Sex-Change Surgery with
Psychotherapy, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1194 (1976).
8. Leff, Genes, Gender and Genital Reversal, MED. WORLD NEWS, April 18, 1977, at
45, 56 [hereinafter cited as Leff]. See also Money & Walker, supra note 5, at 1291. For case
studies which demonstrate the prevalence of preoperative suicide attempts, see Green &
Money, supra note 6; Crovitz, Treatment of the Transsexual and Medicolegal Issues, 7 Fo-
RENSIC SCi. 1 (1976); Herschkowitz & Dickes, Suicide Attempts in a Female-to-Male
Transsexual, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 368 (1978); Stiirup, Male Transsexuals: A Long-Term
Follow-up After Sex Reassignment Operations, 53 ACrA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 51
(1976).
9. See, e.g., APA DRAFT, supra note 4; Money & Walker, supra note 5, at 1289-90;
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES 197 (1975
rev.). In a sense homosexuality and transvestism are both components of transsexualism,
though distinct from it. A male transsexual, for example, regards himself as female and thus
may be attracted to a person of the same anatomical sex. Similarly, he wishes to, and indeed
must, dress as the female "he" is. Money & Walker, supra note 5, at 1289. The distinction
between these conditions is now more widely recognized. See the discussion (paradoxically
listed under "homosexuality") in THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1263 (4th ed. 1975).
In disregard of this knowledge, however, courts frequently confuse all three conditions. See
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United
States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
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unknown etiology' that is capable of amelioration, if not cure,"
uniquely through sex-reassignment treatment.' 2 For the individual in-
volved, however, the treatment is often complicated by sociolegal
problems ultimately directed to the courts. 13 Here jurists usually ask
the medical profession three basic questions: Is transexualism a recog-
nized medical entity?; To what degree is sex reassignment necessary?;
How is gender to be defined?
Recognized Medical Entity
The medical community has moved cautiously in the last twenty-
five years toward an official position on transsexualism. Although
the symptomatology and treatment were described in early litera-
ture,' 4 only in recent years has it become an official classification of
disease."' Undoubtedly the delay stems from the infrequent revision
of medical guides, 16 the investigatory nature of diagnosis and treat-
10. "From all available evidence in the field of psychology as well as physiology, I feel
that no one is justified at this time in saying categorically that transsexuals are made, not
born. The opposite may also be true. More than one cause can bring on
-say--convulsions, and more than one cause is probably responsible for the transsexual
syndrome." Benjamin, Should Surgery be Performed on Transsexuals?, 25 AM. J. PSYCHO-
THERAPY 74, 76 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Benjamin]. Dr. John Money agrees, pointing out
that "prenatal and postnatal influences both play a sequential and mutually essential role."
Leff, supra note 8, at 56. See also R. STOLLER, SEX AND GENDER (1968) (psychoanalytic
interpretation); Ihlenfeld, Thoughts on the Treatment of Transexuals, 6 J. CONTEMP. PSY-
CHOTHERAPY 63, 64 (1973) (neuroendocrine factor).
11. See notes 34-35 & accompanying text infra.
12. For a description of the surgical reassignment procedures, see Laub & Fisk, supra
note 4 (male-to-female); Noe, Birdsell & Laub, The Surgical Construction of Male Genitalia
for the Female-to-Male Transsexual, 53 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 511 (1973).
The extensive preoperative treatment generally consists of a diagnostic evaluation, hormo-
nal therapy and the mandatory, diagnosis-confirming real-Ife test in which the surgical can-
didate lives for one or two years in the prospective gender. See generally Walker, supra note
4; Green & Money, supra note 6.
13. As one doctor put it, "The transsexual needs a good lawyer at least as much as he
needs a good physician." Hoenig, supra note 1, at 319.
14. The first modem reported case of sex reassignment, that of Christine Jorgensen,
was published by the respected Journal of the American Medical Association (JA.M.A.) in
1953. See Hamburger, Sturup & Dahl-Iversen, Tranvestism, 152 J.A.M.A. 391 (1953). A
primitive form of the surgery, however, had been described twenty years earlier in N.
HOYER, MAN INTO WOMAN (1933). See generally Bullough, Transsexualism in History, 4
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 561 (1975).
15. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIANS' CURRENT PROCEDURAL
TERMINOLOGY 231 (4th ed. 1977) (intersex surgery listed: 55,970 (male-to-female), 55,980
(female-to-male)); APA DRAFT, supra note 4 (listed as gender identity disorder); WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES 197 (1975 rev.).
See also A Faltering Response, supra note 6, at 293-94.
16. For example, the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STA-
TISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 79 (2d ed. 1968) omits specific reference to
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ment,17 the emotive subject matter,' or a combination thereof. In any
event, transsexualism no longer is seriously questioned as an accepted
medical entity. In an interim report, one medical administrator stated:
We are now informed that transexualism is recognized as a specific
clinical entity, that it will be included in the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation, and that sex-change surgery or inter-sex surgery will be
included in the new edition of Current Procedural Terminology which
indicates that such surgery is a generally accepted treatment
modality. 19
Acceptance of the syndrome by the medical community has meant in-
creased scientific evaluation, and researchers in numerous centers20
have conducted studies 21 in response to the critical need for medical
and social data.22 A multidisciplinary committee has drafted a code of
standards for diagnosis, care, and follow-up of gender dysphoria pa-
tients.23 Further, the recent formation of a subspecialty24 organization
for gender dysphoria/transsexualism should stimulate professional
transsexualism. However, the revised edition (in draft form only but scheduled for final
printing in 1980) does include the syndrome. See APA DRAFT, supra note 4, at L:2.
17. See Laub & Fisk, supra note 4, at 388, where the Stanford program questioned
transsexualism as a disease and clinically investigated surgical treatment. See also Money &
Schwartz, Public Opinion and Social Issues in Transsexualism: A Case Study in Medical
Sociology, in Green & Money supra note 6, at 253.
18. See, e.g., Money & Schwartz, Public Opinion and Social Issues in Transsexualism:A.
Case Study in Medical Sociology, in Green & Money, supra note 6, at 254.
19. Memorandum from Sterling B. Brinkley, M.D., Director, Medical Affairs, Chair-
man, Ad Hoe Committee on Transsexualism to Dr. Andrew S. Adams, Commissioner of
Rehabilitation Services (Nov. 18, 1976) (available from U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Wel-
fare) [hereinafter cited as Brinkley Memo]. But see notes 81-93 & accompanying text infra.
See also Leff, supra note 8, at 51.
20. See Leff, supra note 8, at 57 (list of 15 major gender dysphoria referral centers, their
locations, specialties, and the number of patients treated).
21. See, e.g., Bentler, A Typology of Transsexualism: Gender Identity Theory and Data
5 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 567 (1975); Green, Sexual Identity: Research Strategies, 4
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 337 (1975); Hore, Nicolle & Calnan, Male Transsexualism in
England: Sixteen Cases with Surgicallmtervention, 4 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 81 (1975);
Lindgren & Pauly, A Body Image Scalefor Evaluating Transsexuals 4 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR 639 (1975); Lundberg, Sjbvall & Walinder, Sella Turcica in Male-to-Female
Transsexuals, 4 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 657 (1975); Sabalis, Staton & Appenzeller,
Transsexualism: Alternate Diagnostic and Etiological Considerations, 37 AM. J. PSYCHOA-
NALYSIS 223 (1977); Stiirup, Male Transsexuals.A Long-Term Follow-up After Sex Reassign-
ment Operations, 53 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 51 (1976).
22. See Stoller, Male Transsexualism: Uneasiness, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 536 (1973)
(urging more follow-up studies); Walker, supra note 4, at 145 (pointing out the need for
continued research and more facilities).
23. See Leff, supra note 8, at 58.
24. Id. The new association was to be formed at the Sixth Interdisciplinary Sympo-
sium on Gender Dysphoria in February 1979, and was to be appropriately named after the
American pioneer in the field, Harry Benjamin. Id.
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awareness of and interest in the disease. In effect, a "stepchild" of the
medical profession has been legitimized.
The medical acceptance of gender dysphoria syndrome and its
prescribed treatment have been incorporated, albeit gradually, into the
law. Commencing in 1975, state legislatures began adopting statutes
providing procedures for postoperative amendment of birth certificates
to reflect an individual's reassigned sex. 25 Similar statutes have been
passed by at least five Canadian provinces. 26 Moreover, Sweden has
legislated a national scheme involving most aspects of the condition.27
Recent judicial decisions in the United States also have acknowledged,
implicity or explicity, the official status of the condition. 28 Given the
preponderance of medical evidence, it now should be difficult for legis-
latures, courts, or governmental agencies to premise inaction or denial
of rights on the experimental or "inconclusive" posture of the disease.
Yet, the vulnerability of the transsexual population invites such disre-
gard, and has nurtured controversy in a variety of socio-economic
contexts.
29
The "Medically Necessary" Controversy
Studies or accounts of gender dysphoric persons invariably de-
25. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-326 (Supp. 1977) (effective 1975); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 10475-79 (West Supp. 1978) (effective 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
§ 73-17 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (effective 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144.23-.24 (West Supp.
1978) (effective 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:61 (West 1977) (effective 1976); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2831-.2832 (Supp. 1978) (effective 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-60
(Cum. Supp. 1977) (effective 1975). Medical proof is required by all these statutes. In addi-
tion, one state provides for change of sex without specific mention of sex-reassignment sur-
gery or transsexualism. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-57-21 (Supp. 1978) (effective 1971, amended
1978). Similar legislation has been proposed in other states, such as Florida. Many states
achieve the same result by utilizing existing correction statutes. New York, for example, has
issued new birth certificates with changed sex designations for approximately 20 "docu-
mented" individuals over the last three years. These alterations are made in accordance
with N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4176 (McKinney 1977) which simply authorizes correction
of "errors" or "defects." Letter from Vito M. Logrillo, N.Y. State Dep't of Health to Joanna
M. Clark (July 21, 1978) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal). But see note 95 infra. See
generally J. CLARK, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSSEXUALISM (1978) (comprehensive list of
state policies on birth certificates) (available from Renaissance Gender Identity Services.
Box 2476, Mission Viejo, Cal. 92690).
26. See ALTA. REV. STAT. 1970 ch. 384, § 21.1 (1973 ch. 86); B.C. REV. STAT. 1962 ch.
66, § 21A (1973 ch. 160); N.B. REV. STAT. 1973 ch. H-2, § 52.1-55(1)(c.1) (1975 ch. 27); N.S.
REV. STAT. 1967 ch. 330, § 21A (1977 ch. 55); SASK. REV. STAT. 1971 ch. 65, § 23C-E (1974-
75 ch. 61). See also Nelson, Paitich & Steiner, Medicolegal Aspects of Transsexualism, 21
CAN. PSYCHIATRIC A.J. 557, 558-64 (1976).
27. See note 110 & accompanying text infra.
28. See, e.g., cases cited notes 44 & 114 infra.
29. See, e.g., notes 67-76 & accompanying text infra.
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scribe the misery and pain characteristically suffered. 30 The severity of
the problem "becomes obvious when one contemplates the reality of
the male transsexual's desperate desire to have normally functioning
male genitals removed because the male sex organs are a source of im-
mense psychological distress."3 1 A surgeon's decision to operate is
carefully considered, even agonizingly made.3 2 The decision generally
follows a lengthy period of diagnostic evaluation involving counseling
and medication, and a "real-life test."'33
The increased incidence of and need for sex reassignment stems
from the failure to perfect a cure34 for gender dysphoria and the fact
that reassignment has proven to be good rehabilitative therapy.35 The
alternative to surgical rehabilitation is relegation to a life of frustration
and despair or suicide.36 Because gender identity differentiation is gen-
erally thought to be established in the first three to five years of life and
is highly resistant to change,37 the medical conclusion developed over
the last twenty-five years is inescapable. Sex reassignment is not
merely a cosmetic treatment aimed at altering structures of the body to
improve or beautify appearances; rather, it is a medical necessity. Re-
cently, however, the issue has been resurrected with a vengence in the
legal context by budget-minded administrators of government medical
and rehabilitation programs who have denied benefits to eligible, medi-
cally diagnosed transsexuals under the pretext that sex reassignment
procedures are experimental, cosmetic, or unnecessary. 38
30. Dr. Pauly is quoted as saying that "[t]he suffering of the transsexual is beyond
belief." Leff, supra note 8, at 56. See also C. JORGENSEN, CHRISTINE JORGENSEN, A PER-
SONAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1967); J. MORRIS, CONUNDRUM (1974).
31. G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 68, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (1978).
32. "I know of no greater 'doctor's dilemma.'" Benjamin, supra note 10, at 78. One
physician outlines the pressures he faces, concluding that "a surgeon dealing with such a
case has to be a missionary content to hope that his reward will be in heaven." E. DE
SAVITSCH, HOMOSEXUALITY, TRANSVESTISM AND CHANGE OF SEX 90 (1958).
33. See note 12 supra.
34. "Cure, if defined as the total eradication of symptoms, has yet to be demonstrated
in an unequivocal case of adult transexualism." Walker, supra note 4, at 143.
35. "Rehibilitative success ... implies only that the patient is better off after surgery
than before, even if some psychiatric symptoms persist." Id. at 145. Although it is difficult
to measuremost researchers agree that the vast majority of transsexuals are better adjusted
after surgery. See, e.g., Money & Gaskin, Sex Reassignment, 9 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 249
(1970-71); Randell, An Emerging Entity, 9 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 275 (1970-71). Whatever
equivocal results are reported can be explained, perhaps, by misdirected goals; if an absolute
standard of cure is used uncertainty will result. Walker, supra note 4, at 144.
36. See generally Brent, Some Legal Problems of the Postoperative Transsexual, 12 J.
FAM. L. 405 (1972-73). See note 8 supra.
37. See Walker, supra note 4, at 143.
38. Transsexuals have had some success, at least, in obtaining medical benefits from
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Medicaid Coverage
The issue of medical necessity was first considered by the New
York Court of Appeals in Denise -R. v. Lavine.39 There, a male-to-fe-
male transsexual who had resided fully as a female for eighteen years
was denied medical assistance for sex reassignment surgery by the New
York City and State Department of Social Services. Although the di-
agnosis was not questioned, the state commissioner determined that
there was insufficient evidence to find medical necessity. He supported
this finding by the testimony of one physician who recommended sur-
gery but had found "no disturbance in thinking or suicidal inclina-
tion."'40 The other medical opinion offered, and apparently discounted
by the commissioner, was that it was "a matter of life and death."'4 '
In affirming the administrative decision, the Court of Appeals re-
versed the appellate court which had held that the commissioner's de-
nial was arbitrary and capricious. The four-to-three majority
concluded that "[w]here an administrator adopts one of several con-
flicting opinions," the court could not "assume the role of either social
agency or legislative body." 42 Arguably, the definition of medical ne-
cessity impliedly affirmed in Denise R. is arbitrary and improper.43
Yet, by allowing evaluation of medical need on an individual basis,
New York policy is less capricious than that of many states.
On facts similar to those in Denise R., a unanimous Minnesota
Supreme Court in Doe v. State, Department of Pub/ic Wefare44 ordered
the state welfare department to fund the plaintiffs reassignment sur-
gery. The decision was based on three grounds. First, the benefits that
Doe sought were funded through Title XIX of the Social Security Act
[hereinafter Medicaid]. 45 Because the program was one of "cooperative
private insurance companies who apparently have not felt as free as governmental agencies
to disregard medical opinion and client need. See ERICKSON EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION,
GUIDELINES FOR TRANSEXUALS 23 (1974). See also A Faltering Response, supra note 6, at
335.
39. 39 N.Y.2d 279, 347 N.E.2d 893, 383 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1976).
40. Id. at 282; 347 N.E.2d at 895, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
41. Id.
42. Id. All examining physicians recommended surgery for this individual. The "con-
flict," then, revolved around whether the patient was likely to commit suicide without the
treatment. Query whether a patient can fairly be denied removal of a painful condition
because he may be able to survive without surgery. The three dissenting judges found medi-
cal necessity "obvious." Id. at 283, 347 N.E.2d at 896, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 570. See also note 48
infra.
43. See notes 49-51 & accompanying text infra.
44. 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976). The New York program is similar but the court in Denise
R. failed to discuss the state-federal relationship. But see Vickers v. Toia, [1977 Transfer
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
federalism," the system had to conform to applicable federal statutes
and regulations as a condition to receiving funds.46 In this case, the
court found the state welfare department's reliance on a published ad-
visory opinion that totally excluded payments for sex-reassignment
surgery47 to be a violation of the Medicaid-implementing regulation
that prohibited a state from arbitrarily denying benefits to individuals
"solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness or condition." 48
Second, the state improperly enunciated its own standard of medi-
cal necessity by requiring an applicant for sex reassignment to prove
that the surgery would eliminate his disability and render him self-sup-
porting. The court astutely observed that such a standard "appearled]
to equate medical necessity with a guarantee of surgical success. Medi-
cal science has not attained the level of precision necessary to assure
each prospective surgical patient that a particular operation will defi-
nitely cure a given disability."49 The court further noted that the self-
support requirement was "ludicrous" and "should not be used in future
cases."150 Rather, agencies should determine medical necessity on a
case-by-case basis by a "thorough, complete, and unbiased medical
evaluation."' 51 Finally, because the local hearing officer's finding of
medical necessity was unchallenged, funding of the surgery was
appropriate. 52
During the same period, a federal district court more precisely de-
fined a state's Medicaid obligation to fund sex-reassignment proce-
dures found to be medically necessary. In Rush v. Parham,53 the
Georgia court examined the state's Medicaid program which expressly
excluded reassignment surgery. Following extensive diagnostic evalua-
tions in which the plaintiff was found to be a true transsexual, surgery
Binder] MEDICAID & MEDICARE GUIDE (CCH) $ 28,507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 1977) (de-
nial of transsexual surgery where evidence fell short of that offered in Denise R. and opera-
tion fit no Medicaid category).
46. 257 N.W.2d at 819; see Rush v. Parham, 440 F. Supp. 383, 385 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
47. THE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PHYSICIAN'S HANDBOOK § 205 excludes 10
medical services from coverage. The court noted, however, that "transsexual surgery is the
only surgical treatment which, if recommended by a physician and related to a patient's
health, is not covered by the program." 257 N.W.2d at 820 (emphasis added).
48. 42 C.F.R. § 449.10(a)(5)(i) (1977). The regulation also provides that "[aippropriate
limits may be placed on services based on such criteria as medical necessity or those con-
tained in utilization or medical review procedures." Id.
49. 257 N.W.2d at 821.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 820.
52. It was only on appeal that the state welfare department denied benefits based on
the two previously referenced improper conclusions of law. Id. at 821.
53. 440 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
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had been recommended as the only alternative to the threat of suicide.
Nonetheless, plaintiff's application for financial assistance was denied;
the state justified its total exclusion on the grounds that, inter alia, pro-
posed surgery was experimental, cosmetic, unsuitable, and
unnecessary.54
The Rush court thought otherwise. In concluding that Medicaid
coverage was "not optional or discretionary for necessary medical
treatment of eligible recipients," the court stated that "[jjudgments of
medical necessity must be made for individual patients and what may
be cosmetic, experimental, palliative, or unnecessary for some, may be
deemed essential for another." 55 The court further held that it was the
province of the physician, in consultation with his patient, to determine
medical necessity.56
As in Minnesota, the Georgia practice of irrebuttably denying
Medicaid coverage for sex-reassignment treatments was held to violate
federal provision.57 Thus, the Rush court ordered the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), the responsible federal agency,
to disapprove the state plan;58 it also enjoined the state from flatly de-
nying benefits and ordered reimbursement of plaintiffs medical costs.59
Two similar California decisions, GB. v. Lackner60 and J.D. v.
Lackner6t parallel those of Rush and Doe. Professionally diagnosed
54. Id. at 386.
55. Id. at 389-90. The conclusion is well-supported by the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
56. "The veracity of an attending physician's certification of medical necessity in an
application for Medicaid reimbursement must be actively enforced by the federal and state
governments." 440 F. Supp. at 390 n.12. See also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 441 n.3 (1977)
S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1943, 1986-87.
57. 42 C.F.R. § 449.10(a)(5)(i) (1977). See note 48 & accompanying text supra. The
court found that the state plan further violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(B) (1976) which
requires a state participating in the Medicaid program to provide at least the care and serv-
ices listed in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(l)-(5) (1976). 440 F. Supp. at 391. Those services gener-
ally include outpatient hospital services, inpatient hospital services, other laboratory and X-
ray services, skilled nursing home services, and physicians services.
58. HEW now recognizes that "[tihe governing Federal Standard for benefits in the
Medicaid program is one of'medical necessity.' . . . [with] no explicit provision in the Fed-
eral statutes or regulations that would prohibit the payment of benefits for transsexual sur-
gery and related services." Letter from Jacqueline Leifer, Office of General Counsel, HEW.
to Joanna M. Clark (March 23, 1978) (footnotes omitted) (on file with The Hastings Law
Journal). HEW still maintains, however, that determination of reimbursement "is a matter
so/ely determined by the states." Id. (emphasis added).
59. 440 F. Supp. at 391.
60. 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978).
61. 80 Cal. App. 3d 90, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1978).
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transsexuals were denied Medicaid benefits under a participating state
plan.62 The state director, in these cases, reversed the original hearing
officer's payment authorization on the ground that sex-reassignment
surgery was "cosmetic" and as such prohibited by California regula-
tions.63 The appellate court in JD. v. Lackner, however, found that
"by the wildest stretch of the imagination," 64 transsexual surgery could
not be characterized as cosmetic. The court in G.B. v. Lackner com-
mented, "Surely castration and penectomy cannot be considered surgi-
cal procedures to alter the texture and configuration of the skin and the
skin's relationship with contiguous structures of the body. Male geni-
tals have to be considered more than just skin, one would think. '65
Inasmuch as the surgery was arbitrarily classified as cosmetic and the
only evidence in the case was that surgery was necessary, the director's
decision was reversed and payment granted in both cases. 66
The Doe, Rush, and Lackner cases, using current authoritative
medical information fused with cogent legal analyses, provided equita-
ble treatment for a powerless, needy minority. It is doubtful, however,
that gender dysphoric persons can rest comfortably with these newly
acquired rights.
In direct response to the Lackner decisions, 67 California State Sen-
ator Paul Carpenter promptly introduced a bill that would prohibit
payment for "costs of transsexual treatment services committed solely
to accomplish a gender change in the individual. '68 Ostensibly, the
62. California's state plan, Medi-Cal, derives from the Medi-Cal Act, CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 14000-14194 (West 1972 & Supp. 1973-1977).
63. The regulation reads: "Procedures for the treatment of defects for cosmetic pur-
poses only are covered subject to prior authorization. Authorization for procedures prima-
rily for purposes of correcting cosmetic defects may be granted only to: (1) Complete the
repair of serious disfigurement resulting from disease or trauma. (2) Correct disfiguring
defects which substantially interfere with opportunities for employment . . . (3) Provide
necessary services to patients eligible for coverage by Crippled Children Services." CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 51305(g) (Sept. 11, 1976).
64. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 95, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 572. See also G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App.
3d 64, 71, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559.
65. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
66. California also had a policy that prohibited payment for any procedure relating to
sex reassignment. Id. at 66-67, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 556. The court, however, found that the
director had relied on the "cosmetic" approach and thus it did not consider the irrebuttable
denial argument. Id. at 71, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
67. See CAL. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH & WELFARE, STAFF ANALYSIS OF SENATE
BILL No. 2200 (June 1978). Support came from the Chamber of Commerce; opposition
came from a legal aid society. Id.
68. Cal. SB 2200 (1978). This would have added § 14137 to the California Welfare and
Institutions Code. The bill passed the Senate but died in the Assembly Health Committee
and thus will not become law. Originally the bill prohibited payment for "costs of cosmetic.
March 1979] EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
concern was financial. Indeed, section 2 makes the act "an urgency
statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health, or safety . . . . [i]n order that payments under Medi-Cal for
transsexual treatment services may be discontinued as soon as possi-
ble."'69 The urgency clause of the Carpenter bill was utilized despite
the fact that the Department of Health had no official position and
could not even estimate the number of claimants or the costs in-
volved. 70 Of course, there is the strong possibility that far greater sums
would be paid to untreated transsexuals in welfare costs attributed to
disability and unemployment 7' than would be saved by the passage of
the Carpenter bill.
It also seems reasonable to assume that any genuine fiscal concern
is tinged by an emotional reaction to a "bizarre" minority without po-
litical clout.72 Indeed, the vulnerability of transsexuals stems from a
lack of numbers.73 The predicament is compounded by the fact that
gender dysphoric persons, unlike many others with a medical condition
or disability, are not the recipients of societal sympathy.74 Profoundly
misunderstood, they are conceived toprefer their condition or at best to
have brought it on themselves; cruelly deemed freaks of nature, their
condition is not taken seriously.75 So long as these convenient myths
are perpetuated, gender dysphoric individuals will remain second-class
surgery, including sex change operations." This was amended at the suggestion of the De-
partment of Health. CAL. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH & WELFARE, STAFF ANALYSIS OF
SENATE BILL No. 2200 (June 1978). This undoubtedly was in recognition of the sound
Lackner reasoning.
69. Cal. SB 2200 (1978).
70. CAL. SENATL COMM. ON HEALTH & WELFARE, STAFF ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL
No. 2200 (June 1978).
71. See, e.g., Denise R. v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 279, 283-84, 347 N.E.2d 893, 896, 383
N.Y.S.2d 568, 571 (1976).
72. Regarding his sponsorship of SB 2200, Carpenter was quoted as saying that
"[slufficient unmet health needs should be responded to prior to cosmetic surgery." San
Francisco Chronicle, June 21, 1978. Not only does this opinion totally ignore recent medical
and legal definitions of "cosmetic," but "unmet health needs" is not explained. Query what
incentive there is for any politician to fully investigate and support the needs of gender
dysphorics. See Cook, Nondiscrimination in Employment Under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 31, 34-35 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Cook] (political weakness of
disabled groups in general).
73. Estimates of the number of transsexuals who have undergone reassignment surgery
vary. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 8, at 51, 57 (under 1,000); Lindgren & Pauly, .4 Body Image
Scale for Evaluating Transsexuals, 4 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 639, 640 (1975) (about
1,800). Today the number is perhaps closer to 3,000. In any event, the numbers are rela-
tively small in relation to a population of over 200 million Americans.
74. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 72, at 37.
75. See notes 67-70 & accompanying text supra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
citizens.76
Other Health Benefits
No cases, as yet, have come before the courts regarding denial of
medical benefits to transsexual individuals under other government
programs. Certain policies, however, are likely to be challenged given
the present accumulation of medical knowledge and legal doctrine.
With respect to Medicare77 benefits, a representative of the Medi-
care Bureau of HEW stated:
Medicare benefits have never included and do not now include
transsexual surgery. Claims have been filed with Medicare for reim-
bursement of amounts paid by beneficiaries for this procedure.
Those claims have been denied, however, on the basis of advice re-
ceived several years ago from our medical consultants that transsexual
surgery was neither proven by medical evidence to be a safe and ef-
fective procedure nor accepted as such by the medical community. It
was regarded as experimental and like other experimental proce-
dures has not been covered.78
Although the author went on to recognize that "increasing clinical
evidence about transsexual surgery . . . has raised current questions
about the experimental nature of the surgery," 79 HEW continues to
deny coverage. Considering available medical and legal documenta-
tion in the field, the agency has reflected:
Because of the controversial nature of this surgery and the gen-
eral lack of understanding about it, consideration is being given to
convening a panel of recognized experts to advise the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare on whether there are circumstances
when Medicare should pay for transsexual surgery and what those
circumstances are.80
Similarly, HEW has demonstrated an unwillingness to transfer
knowledge gained about gender dysphoria into revision of its rehabili-
tation services policy.8' Under this program, HEW provides funds to
participating states for handicapped individuals experiencing employ-
ment difficulty. 2 On August 20, 1973, a policy memo was issued by the
Assistant Commissioner for Program Management, Rehabilitation
76. See note 102 & accompanying text infra.
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. V 1975).
78. Letter on file with The Hastings Law Journal (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-776 (Supp. V 1975).
82. Id. at § 706(6). For the scope of vocational rehabilitation services, see id. § 723.
See text accompanying note 265 infra for a definition of "handicapped individual."
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Services, to the Associate Regional Commissioner, Region 1,83 that
denied financial assistance for transsexual diagnostic services, surgery,
and electrolysis. The decision was predicated on the belief that the
condition had not yet reached the "status of a professionally accepted
or recognized modality of treatment. '8 4 A transsexual person's eligibil-
ity as a handicapped person, however, was not questioned.
As requests for assistance continued, the then Commissioner of
Rehabilitative Services, Andrew Adams, convened a committee to re-
view, inter alia, "the State of the Art as it involves transsexualism." 85
The interim report of this committee recognized the condition as a
clinical entity,8 6 noting:
We recognize the fact that the goal of vocational rehabilitation must
be concerned with employment, not the physical results of plastic
surgery per se. We are also mindful of the requirement that State
agencies establish priorities which give first consideration for persons
with the most severe handicaps.
But we are also aware of the fact that State agencies are prohib-
ited from excluding any group of individuals solely on the basis of
the type of disability.87
The group reviewed recent medical information and applicable
federal regulations. Although no final report was published, the tenta-
tive results pointed to an equitable revision of policy. 88
83. Memo available from HEW. See also A Faltering Response, supra note 6, at 333 for
major portions of the text as it appeared in a subsequent letter.
84. See A Faltering Response, supra note 6, at 333.
85. Brinkley Memo, supra note 19.
86. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
87. Brinkley Memo, supra note 19. The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 underscores the need for the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) to increase
services to persons with severe handicaps. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
18-19, reprinted in [19731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2092. This goal, however,
was largely aimed at reducing service to "those individuals whose only handicap may be
their environment or social disadvantage [since those] individuals ...should be served
under programs already in existence for their express benefit." Id. at 26, reprinted in [1973]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2099. This is inapplicable to gender dysphoric individu-
als who primarily suffer from a medically related disability and who are not covered by an"
services for their "express benefit."
88. In an informal telephone conversation on July 31, 1978, Dr. Brinkley explained
that the committee found that, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 706(6), transsexuals did
have a physical or mental disability which could, in individual cases, constitute a substantial
handicap to employability. The question, and probable basis for denial of rehabilitation
services, was whether the transsexual could reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of
employability. See note 82 supra. In view of the Doe, Rush, and Lackner decisions, see text
accompanying notes 46-66 supra, and because the statute requires only "reasonable" expec-
tation of benefit, it is suggested that HEW might at least allow consideration of the
employability issue on a case-by-case basis. See S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 21,
reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2094. "Believing... the final goal
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This promise was short-lived. In 1978, the new Commissioner,
Robert R. Humphreys, sent a memo89 to the director of the Region IV
office reaffirming the August 20, 1973 policy. Without explanation, the
Commissioner decided that "[a]lthough transsexualism is now recog-
nized as a diagnostic entity by a number of physicians and professional
persons in allied fields, this entity does not constitute a disabling condi-
tion as interpreted by the RSA for the establishment of eligibility for
vocational rehabilitation services by State vocational rehabilitation
agencies." 90
Further, the new commissioner was unpersuaded by the inclusion
of intersex surgery in the American Medical Association handbook 9'
which did "not of itself carry with it a designation of an approved treat-
ment modality.' 92 And he failed to address other compelling evidence
of medical acceptance. 93 Thus, the gender dysphoric individual appar-
ently will be denied vocational rehabilitation services absent adminis-
trative or judicial review.94
Definition of Gender
One of the earliest and most persistent legal questions pertinent to
the gender dysphoric person has been the definition of that individual's
gender. Most frequently the question has arisen by requests of postop-
erative transsexuals to legalize their status by amendment of civil
of all rehabilitation services was to improve in every possible respect the lives as well as
livelihood of individuals served, the [reviewing] committee placed particular emphasis on
developing a method of providing services that would be responsive to individual needs and
would insure that no individual would be excluded from the program merely because his
handicap appeared to be too severe." Id. at 4, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2079 (emphasis in original). The legislative intent is individualized evaluation-no
group should be flatly denied on appearances only. The need to serve "severely" disabled
persons is emphasized mainly because this group frequently had been denied services. It is
arguable that transsexual individuals are, by virtue of frequently being denied services, also
severely handicapped.
89. Memorandum from Robert R. Humphreys to HEW Region IV (undated) (received
Apr. 3, 1978 by Region IX Office) (available from HEW).
90. Id.
91. See note 15 supra.
92. Memo from Robert R. Humphreys to HEW Region IV (undated) (received Apr. 3,
1978 by Region IX Office) (available from HEW).
93. See notes 14-29 & accompanying text supra.
94. Many transsexual individuals have no need for rehabilitation services. They have
successful careers and well-developed employment skills. However, many others "have
poor work histories and may have been unable to work." Letter from Paul A. Walker,
Director, The Gender Clinic, University of Texas Medical Branch to authors, (July 24, 1978)
(on file with The Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Walker Letter]. The availabil-
ity of rehabilitation services to those individuals may be critical.
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records.95 The legal task was complicated by a general presumption
that a person was necessarily of an obvious and permanent sex. 96 Nor
had there been previous occasion to legally define sex or a body of
knowledge to rely upon when the need to do so finally arose. Courts
and legal commentators thus borrowed medical expertise and criteria
to formulate their own definitions. 97
The outcome of the controversy, in the jurisdictions that have ad-
dressed the issue, has been a recognition that "sexual gender is not
merely a matter of anatomy ... 98 and that [b]asing determination of
gender upon any one indicator might well lead to an unwarranted con-
clusion." 99 In an earlier decision, the court in In re Anonymous opined
that "[a] male transsexual who submits to a sex-reassignment is ana-
tomically and psychologically a female in fact." 100 Then, in Richards v.
95. See generally Holloway, Transsexuals-Their Legal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 282,
293-95 (1968); A Faltering Response, supra note 6, at 305-10; An Enlightened Perspective,
supra note 6, at 412-15; Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, supra note 6. at 351-54;
Transsexualism, supra note 6, at 992-1000; Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 6, at 239-43.
All of these commentators argue for the legal acceptance of a transsexual's intended postop-
erative sex. Absent fraud, courts have allowed names to be changed. See In re Anonymous,
57 Misc. 2d 813, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1968); In re Anonymous, 64 Misc. 2d 309,
314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970). Nonetheless, certain courts have refused to order
amendment of birth certificates to reflect the newly conformed anatomical and psychologic
sex. See Anonymous v. Mellon, 91 Misc. 2d 375, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1977); K. v.
Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977); Hartin v. Director of
Bureau of Records & Statistics, 75 Misc. 2d 229, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1973). But see
Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975) (substantial state interest must be
demonstrated to uphold denial of application). For a challenge to the presumption of two
distinct and immutable sexes, see Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities." A
Crisis of the Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 1131 (1979).
96. See, e.g., A Faltering Response, supra note 6, at 288-89; Constitutionalit;' of the Chro-
mosome Test, supra note 6, at 335; cf. Starr, Cutting the Ties that Bind, HARPERS, May 1978,
at 48, 48-49 (criticizing the breakdown of this premise).
97. See Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
where the court relied on information from the N.Y. Academy of Medicine. Another court
lists the following determinates of a person's sex: anatomy, psychological identity, accepta-
bility by others, chromosomal makeup, reproductive capacity, and endocrine levels. Anony-
mous v. Mellon, 91 Misc. 2d 375, 377, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1977). For a general
discussion of defining sex in cases of gender dysphoria, see A Faltering Response, supra note
6, at 290 (8 variables listed); Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, supra note 6;
Transsexualism, supra note 6, at 965-72 (7 variables listed); Transsexuals in Athletics, supra
note 6, at 374 (8 variables listed).
98. Anonymous v. Mellon, 91 Misc. 2d 375, 377, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
99. Id. See also In re Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d 813, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834; Richards v.
United States Tennis Ass'n, 93 Misc. 2d 713, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977): M.T. v. J.T.,
140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (marriage context). But see
Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Corbett v. Cor-
bett, [1970] 2 All. E.R. 33 (marriage context).
100. 57 Misc. 2d 813, 817, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 838 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (emphasis added).
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United States Tennis Association,101 the New York Supreme Court
found that "[wihen an individual such as plaintiff, a successful physi-
cian, a husband and father, finds it necessary for his own mental sanity
to undergo a sex reassignment, the unfoundedfears and misconceptions
of defendants must give way to the overwhelming medical evidence that
this person is now female."102 Thus, a tennis association could not
solely rely on a sex chromatin test to determine whether a male-to-
female postsurgical transsexual was a female for purposes of tourna-
ment play.
Notwithstanding the strong impetus-medical, legal, and humani-
tarian-for acceptance of postoperative transsexual individuals in their
newly conformed anatomic, social, and psychic sex, 10 3 some courts
have declined the opportunity to determine an individuars sex by bas-
ing decisions on other grounds. Thus, certain adverse agency determi-
nations have been undisturbed where they are not arbitrary'0 4 or where
they would amount to substitution of the court's views for those of the
responsible administrative body.'0 5 At least one tribunal has left the
101. 93 Misc. 2d 713, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
102. Id. at 722, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (emphasis added). Compare the suggestion of the
student commentator in Transsexuals in Athletics, supra note 6, that a transsexual should be
accepted in his or her newly conformed anatomic sex in some situations, but not for pur-
poses of tennis tournaments. Although fairness to competitors is the concern, this solution is
not without a certain theoretical incongruity. Consider the case of a female-to-male postop-
erative transsexual individual who is able to qualify for play as a female, but not male, using
the sex chromatin test. There would be far greater unfairness, it seems, to require a hirsute,
muscular, strong and otherwise masculine player to complete with females. Total exclusion
of postoperative transsexuals from competition, the alternative, would raise equal protection
arguments. See Leff, supra note 8, at 45 & 48 for graphic examples of this problem. Note
also that exclusion of or limitations on postoperative transsexual individuals would neces-
sarily encompass a good many other individuals who require, for one reason or another,
surgical sex reassignment. See, e.g., Money, Ablatio Penis: Normal Male Infant Sex-Reas-
signedas a Girl, 4 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 65 (1975) (normal infants reassigned after
postnatal accident); Money & Walker, supra note 5, at 1294.
103. The summation by one judge is illustrative: "It is the opinion of the court that if the
psychological choice of a person is medically sound, not a mere whim, and irreversible sex
reassignment surgery has been performed, society has no right to prohibit the transsexual
from leading a normal life. Are we to look upon this person as an exhibit in a circus side
show? What harm has said person done to society? The entire area of transsexualism is
repugnant to the nature of many persons within our society. However, this should not gov-
ern the legal acceptance of a fact." M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 83, 355 A.2d 204, 207
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (quoting trial judge).
104. Anonymous v. Mellon, 91 Misc. 2d 375, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Hartin v.
Director of Bureau of Records & Statistics, 75 Misc. 2d 229, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct.
1973).
105. Anonymous v. Mellon, 91 Misc. 2d 375, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Anony-
mous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966); K. v. Department of
Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
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determination of the post-operative's sex to be decided by the legisla-
ture as "a matter of public policy."'10 6
Such judicial passivism undoubtedly adds to the grief of gender
dysphoric people who are struggling to rehabilitate themselves and to
blend into society. It has nonetheless generated various legislative
responses.
For example, in 1977 the California legislature adopted AB 385
which provides, upon court order, for the issuance of a new birth
certificate that will supplant any birth certificate previously registered
for the applicant and will be the only birth certificate open to public
inspection. 10 7 One committee considering the measure realized that a
state's failure to provide statutory means of amendment had the effect
of "complicating the legal identity facing the post-operative transsex-
ual," 0 8 noting further that "[t]he procedure. . . is identical to that fol-
lowed for the sealing of the original birth certificate and issuance of a
new birth record for adopted persons. The Vital Statistics Section, De-
partment of Health, sees no procedural difficulties in implementing the
bill." 109
Sweden has passed comprehensive national legislation that en-
ables "both somatic intersexuals and transsexuals to have the question
of 'gender role' judged in accordance with suitable principles and to
obtain a binding decision which would determine the permanent future
sex role.""10 Similar legislation has been urged in Britain."'
106. K. v. Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 376, 560 P.2d 1070, 1072
(1977). See also note 42 & accompanying text supora.
107. AB 385 was codified as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 10475-10479 (West Supp.
1978). The provision further provides that a physician's affidavit documenting the sex
change must accompany the petition. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10475(a) (West
Supp. 1978). Similar statutes have been passed in other states and Canadian provinces. See
notes 25-26 supra.
108. CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HEALTH, ANALYSIs-AB 385 (BRowN), at 2 (1977).
109. Id. Additionally, local costs would be minor and any cost to the general fund
would be offset by the five-dollar application fee. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, ANALYSIS OF
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 385 (BRowN) at 2 (Aug. 23, 1977). Interestingly, the Department of
Health expected "less than 100 such applications" per year. Id. Arizona, under a similar
statute, has had only eleven requests since 1976. Letter from Alfonso Bravo, Manager Ari-
zona Vital Records Section to Joanna M. Clark (July 20, 1978) (on file with The Hastings
Law Journal).
110. WOLINDER and Thuwe, A Law Concerning Sex Reassignment of Transsexuals in
Sweden, 5 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 255 (1975). Effective since 1972, the law regulates.
inter alia, surgical reassignment and official change of sex designation. 1d. Once the Na-
tional Board has granted authorization for change of sex, the "assumption of the new 'gen-
der identity' thereby becomes incontestable, not only in respect of the new sex registration
• . . but also in other legal connections." 1d. at 257. See also Hoenig, supra note I, at 322-
23.
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Such standards serve to legitimize the transsexual person's newly
conformed sex. Though seemingly aimed at one narrow problem, these
measures may positively affect, directly or potentially, a number of
other postoperative legal dilemmas, e.g marriage, I I2 inheritance," I3
and criminal liability. 114
Still, this narrow panoply of statutes falls far short of a consistent
policy or set of definitions with respect to the gender dysphoric person.
The inability of the legal system to digest and reflect the accumulation
I 11. "The only answer is an Act of Parliament .... There must be many thousands of
actual or incipient trans-sexuals in this country whose problems could be dealt with in this
way, thus releasing them from terrible mental anguish and society from the ridiculous conse-
quences of a too rigid attitude, followed by the typical English compromise of the legal
'fiction', that a person may be one thing for one purpose and another for another-John Doe
or Joan Doe?" Walton, When isa Woman not a Woman?, 124 NEw L.J. 501, 501-502 (1974).
112. In reviewing the implications of AB 385, a member of the committee astutely
asked: "Is not passage of AB 385 necessary if transsexuals are to marry without being forced
into a homosexual marriage banned by AB 607." CAL. SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
BIRTH CERTIFICATES: REVISION FOR SEX CHANGE-AB 385 (1977). AB 607 was codified in
1977 as CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4100-4101 (West Supp. 1978). It provides, inter alia, that
"[m]arriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a
woman." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). For decisional law
on point, see M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(male-to-female postoperative transsexual held female); Frances B. v. Mark B., 78 Misc. 2d
112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (female-to-male postoperative transsexual without
functional genitalia held female); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d
499 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (preoperative male-to-female not female); Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2
All. E.R. 33 (male-to-female postoperative transsexual not female). See generally A Faltering
Response, supra note 6, at 316-26; Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, supra note 6, at
345-51; Comment, Marriage Rights.- Homosexuals and Transsexuals, 8 AKRON L. REV. 369
(1975); An Enlightened Perspective, supra note 6, at 417-26; Transsexualism, supra note 6, at
1003-08; Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 6, at 244-47. For a case allowing a transsexual
parent to retain child custody, see Christian v. Randall, 33 Colo. App. 129, 516 P.2d 132
(1973).
113. Although no cases have been heard to date, conceivably a court may be asked to
decide the sex of an individual if, for instance, property were devised to male or female heirs
only. See generally A Faltering Response, supra note 6, at 327; Transsexuals in Limbo, supra
note 6, at 247-51.
114. In holding a cross-dressing statute an unconstitutional infringement of defendant
transsexuals' liberty interests, the Illinois Supreme Court recently opined that "[tlhrough the
enactment of [a statute] which authorizes the issuance of a new certificate of birth following
sex-reassignment surgery, the legislature has implicitly recognized the necessity and validity
of such surgery. It would be inconsistent to permit sex-reassignment surgery yet, at the same
time, impede the necessary therapy in preparation for such surgery." City of Chicago v.
Wilson, No. 49229 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May 1978), rev'g 44 Ill. App. 3d 620, 357 N.E.2d 1337
(1976). See also City of Columbus v. Rogers, 41 Ohio St. 2d 161, 324 N.E.2d 563 (1975).
See generally Note, City of Chicago v. Wilson and Constitutional Protection/or Personal.4p-
pearance: Cross-Dressing as an Element of Sexual Identity, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1151 (1979).
Regarding other aspects of criminal law, see State v. Cherry, 154 N.J. Super. 157, 381 A.2d
49 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (incarceration); People v. Steadman, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 280
N.E.2d 17 (1972) (sentencing).
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of medical documentation has left lacunae that have impinged upon
other aspects of the transsexual person's life. One critical area is that of
employment conditions which will be examined in the remainder of
this Article.
Sex Discrimination in Employment
That most individuals with gender dysphoria experience employ-
ment discrimination is well established. 115 The disorder and its treat-
ment invites unstudied, negative responses fed by fear of the unknown
or purported moral or religious considerations because "[q]uestions of
sexual deviation and sexual abnormalities probably provoke more
emotional responses in society generally than almost any other
subject."116
Because the reactions of employers, judges, legislators, and admin-
istrators often are colored by their own attitudes toward these sub-
jects,"l7 there is a particular need to monitor private and public
discriminatory policies in the employment arena.
115. See, e.g., G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 68, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (1978)
(testimony of treating physician that preoperative transsexuals often are unable to obtain
employment because of employers' biases); Levine, Gruenewald & Shaiova, Behavioral Dif-
ferences and Emotional Conflict Among Male-to-Female Transsexuals, 5 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR 81, 83 (1975) (unwillingness of employers to hire or retain known transsexual
individuals and employment problems resulting from fear of detection with its concomitant
tawdry comments); Matto, The Transsexualin Society, 10 CRIMINOLOGY 85, 102 (1972) (em-
ployment discrimination noted) [hereinafter cited as Matto].
116. Brent, Some Legal Problems of the Postoperative Transsexual, 12 J. FAM. L. 405,
420-21 (1972-73). In addition to cases discussed in notes 119-209 & accompanying text infra,
numerous other reports of bald discrimination against transsexual persons have been re-
ported. See, e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, June 6, 1976, § A, at 14, col. I (Detroit male-to-
female transsexual suspended for refusing to wear a man's uniform); San Francisco Chroni-
cle, Aug. 30, 1978, at 6, col. 1 (male-to-female teacher dismissed). Most discriminatees, how-
ever, never come to public attention or file lawsuits.
117. Brent, Some Legal Problems ofthe Postoperative Transsexual, 12 J. FAM. L. 405,
420-21 (1972-73). Even where a judge or administrator initially reacts favorably to the needs
of transsexuals, publicity about the matter may cause a reversal. See, e.g., Transsexualism,
supra note 6, at 1000-01 n.252 (judge declined to rule favorably on name changes following
adverse publicity); San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 30, 1978, at 6, col. I (school administra-
tors decided to fire transsexual teacher following publicity). In Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies
Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), afl'd, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978), the
district court recanted its original finding ofjurisdiction "coincidently" following the release
of a news story, with photograph, of plaintiff Voyles. Even doctors and nurses initially unfa-
miliar with gender dysphoria react "emotionally". Matto, supra note 115, at 98. For first
hand accounts of this phenomenon, see Ihlenfeld, Thoughts on the Treatment of
Transsexuals, 6 J. CONTEMP. PSYCHOTHERAPY 63, 64-65 (1973); Laub & Fisk, supra note 4.
at 368; Strait, The Transsexual Patient After Surgery, 73 AM. J. NURSING 462 (1973). Con-
sider also the impact of a singular undocumented, emotive article where transsexualism is
defined as a "more or less occult subject," a "contagious disease," and great fear is expressed
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Federal Decisions
In four recent cases federal courts considered whether discrimina-
tory employment practices taken against transsexual individuals were
proscribed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.118
The first published decision was the district court order granting
defendant's (employer's) motion to dismiss in Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies
Medical Center.'19 There, Voyles, a hemodialysis technician at a large
private hospital, was discharged for "the conceded reason that she in-
tended to change sex and that such a change might have a potentially
adverse effect on both the patients receiving treatment at the dialysis
unit and on plaintiff's co-workers caring for those patients.' 20 Em-
ployed at the hospital for nearly five years as a male, Voyles' termina-
tion was triggered by her request to be called by her new feminine
name-a medical necessity required by the treating physician and psy-
chiatric counselor.121
In Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,122 the plaintiff, employed as
a male multilith operator, was terminated after some five years of serv-
ice after having informed her supervisor that she was undergoing treat-
ment in preparation for anatomical sex change surgery. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed a judgment granting the employer's motion to dismiss,
ruling that Title VII did not embrace transsexual discrimination.
Two similar decisions were subsequently rendered at the district
court level. In Grossman v. Bernards Township Board of Education,123
the plaintiff was discharged from her job as a teacher following sex
reassignment. In Powell v. Read's Inc. ,124 a man was engaged in a trial
venture of living as a woman as a prerequisite to having surgery. On
her first day of work as a waitress, Powell was dismissed by the supervi-
sor who had been informed by a customer that Powell previously had
for the "social cost that results from it." Starr, Cutting the Ties that Bind, HARPERS, May
1978, at 48, nn.52 & 56.
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). The statute provides in relevant part: "It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual... because of
such individual's . . .sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). For jurisdictional and other
prerequisites to litigation, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to 2000e-8 (1976).
119. 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affid, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
120. Id. at 456.
121. Brief for Appellant at 5.
122. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
123. 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,686 (D.N.J. 1975), afjd, 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 181 (1976).
124. 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977).
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been a man. As in Holloway, the court held that Title VII did not
embrace sexual reassignment.
Although factual nuances distinguish all four decisions, 12 5 the fed-
eral judiciary's response to various plaintiff contentions have been
nearly uniform in rejecting claims by transsexuals of discrimination
under Title VII.
Jurisdiction
Each of the discharged employees in these federal cases attempted
to invoke the protection against sexual discrimination afforded by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.126 Their theory was essentially that
sex discrimination was equivalent to gender discrimination or discnmi-
nation based on sex-reassignment surgery. To the extent that the sur-
gery merely conformed the employee's body to his or her appropriate
gender, any discriminatory employment practice was necessarily
barred by the statute.1 27
In each case, discrimination on the basis of "sex" was distin-
guished from "change of sex." Thus, in each instance, the court con-
cluded that it lacked jurisdiction, and dismissed the complaint without
a decision on the merits.
Remarkably, the Voyles court recanted its initial determination of
jurisdiction, 2 8 and by footnote observed that "persuasive evidence was
adduced in support of the hospital's decision to discharge Voyles fol-
lowing testimony concerning the probable adverse impact that the
transsexual technician would have had on the staff and patients in the
hemodialysis unit."'' 2 9 However, at no time during the lawsuit did the
hospital file affidavits from any patient expressing dissatisfaction, dis-
gust, or shock with Voyles' intent to undergo sex correction. 30 Rather,
Voyles had consulted with co-workers in the hemodialysis unit before
125. For example, Grossman was postoperative while Voyles had been undergoing hor-
mone treatment for the six months prior to her termination. Holloway voluntarily disclosed
the imminent surgery; Powell was "revealed" by a customer's discussion with management.
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
127. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977);
Powell v. Read's Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 370 (D. Md. 1977).
128. Reporter's Transcript at 15, Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F.
Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1976), afjfd, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
129. 403 F. Supp. at 457 n.3.
130. Brief for Appellant at 6 n.5. In Holloway, an affidavit by the employee's supervisor
detailed many of the personnel "problems" created by appellant's transitional appearance
(red lipstick and nail polish, hairstyle, jewelry and clothing, "his" use of the men's room and




making the personnel request, and had received supportive affidavits
from four coworkers. Five additional affidavits from patients expressed
shock and indignation at the hospital's decision to terminate Voyles,
rather than at her corrective surgery. 131
Nonetheless, because discrimination of a transsexual was held not
to be covered by the federal statute, the courts did not consider the
proffered "bona fide occupational qualification defense."' 132 That is, al-
though the employee could state a prima facie case for discrimina-
tion, 133 the employer never was compelled to come forward with a
defense to this showing. 134
Legislative History
While conceding the dearth of legislative history on Title VII, the
Holloway, Voyles, Grossman, and Powell courts opted for limited or
restrictive construction. In Holloway, the court noted that "[s]ex as a
basis of discrimination was added as a floor amendment one day before
the House approved Title VII [race discrimination] without prior hear-
ing or debate."' 135 The Voyles decision suggested that "Congress' para-
mount, if not sole, purpose in banning employment practices
predicated upon an individual's sex was to prohibit conduct which, had
the victim been a member of the opposite sex, would not have other-
wise occurred,"' 136 specifically referring to the economic deprivation
suffered by women which prompted the enactment of Title VII's
antidiscrimination provisions. The Powell decision confirmed the
Grossman 137 court's reluctance to ascribe any import to the term "sex"
131. Id.
132. Under Title VII, a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense is "meant
to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination." Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). To establish a BFOQ defense an employer must
factually demonstrate a reasonable cause to believe that "all or substantially all" of the
excluded class are unable to perform the relevant job. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
133. Indeed, in Voyles, the employer admitted discrimination. Reporter's Transcript at
15.
134. Some of the principal defenses which have been recognized in Title VII cases to
date are (1) selection criteria which are job-related and thus are a business necessity; (2)
business necessity; (3) a bona fide occupational qualification; and (4) a bona fide seniority or
merit system. See B.L. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 1196
(1976).
135. 566 F.2d at 662 (citing Willinghaim v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1090 (5th Cir. 1975)); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title V11 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1167 (1971)).
136. 403 F. Supp. at 457 (citing Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th
Cir. 1974)).
137. 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 6884-85.
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other than its plain meaning in the absence of legislative history indi-
cating Congressional intent to include transsexuals within the language
of Title VII.138
Later legislative activity-bills introduced to amend the Civil
Rights Act to prohibit discrimination against "sexual prefer-
ence"-were cited by the courts as further evidence of the narrow
definition. 139
Sex Plus
Explicitly rejecting the plaintiffs suggestions that "sex" as referred
to in Title VII was synonymous with "gender" and that gender would
encompass transsexual individuals, the Voyles 140 and Holoway'
4
'
courts were not persuaded by medical testimony and documentation
which attempted to distinguish transsexualism from sexual affectations
or preferences. Thus, Voyles' contention that it was the "immutability"
of her female identity (trapped in a male body) that triggered her dis-
charge was not accepted by the Ninth Circuit. 1
42
Nor did the same courts adopt the argument that Voyles' sex
"plus" the neutral factor of her undergoing corrective surgery, rendered
the employer's decision to terminate violative of the basic thrust and
purpose of Title VII under the "sex-plus cases."1
43
Specifically, Voyles requested that the court apply the traditional
standard to determine whether there had been sex-plus discrimination;
that is, whether the employer's distinction in the application of employ-
ment practices to different classes of employees was applied on the ba-
sis of something other than immutable characteristics or fundamental
human rights.'44 She contended that corrective surgery for a transsex-
138. 436 F. Supp. at 370.
139. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977);
Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affid,
570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978). The Voyles court noted, however, that it was "unclear whether
the House bills . . . are intended to cover discrimination of the type here alleged, since they
referred only to 'affectional or sexual preference' as additional bases upon which employers
would be precluded from discharging their employees." Id.
140. 403 F. Supp. at 457 n.2.
141. 566 F.2d at 662.
142. Brief for Appellant at 6.
143. Id. at 7; Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971) (affording Title VII protection to married female cabin attendants where the
employer's policy did not similarly exclude married males); Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employer refusing to employ women with preschool age chil-
dren, while hiring men with preschool age children).
144. Brief for Appellant at 13.
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ual person was in the first instance an immutable characteristic, since it
was a necessary physical treatment recommended by her physician for
the sake of her physical and psychological well-being. 145 Moreover,
Voyles contended that the corrective surgery was a "fundamental
right" and deserved the same protection as the rights to have children
and to marry implicitly created by earlier decisions. 46 Thus, an em-
ployer's requirement that Voyles retain her anatomical gender or lose
her job was argued to be "no less of an infringement of her fundamen-
tal right to receive medical treatment than was an employer's demand
that a married person obtain a divorce or a parent put up a child for
adoption."' 47 Interestingly, none of the four federal decisions voiced
positions on that thread of the employee's arguments.
Constitutional Arguments
In considering the plaintiff's claim that the restrictive interpreta-
tion of the language of Title VII, flatly excluding transsexual persons,
raised equal protection problems, the Holloway court refused to confer
"suspect status" upon the class of transsexuals. 148 The Court reasoned
that transsexual individuals were not necessarily a discrete and insular
minority; transsexuals did not share an "immutable characteristic de-
termined solely by the accident of birth like race and national origin";
and that the complexities involved in defining the term "transsexual"
alone would prohibit a determination of suspect classification. Apply-
ing the rational relationship test, the court determined that "it can be
said without question that the prohibition of employment discrimina-
tion between male and females. . . is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. Indeed. . . transsexuals claiming discrimination
because of their sex, male or female, would clearly state a cause of
action," 149 but not plaintiffs who were transsexuals and chose to change
their sex.150
Postoperative Protection
Only Judge Goodwin's dissent in Holloway recognized that
transsexual employment discrimination cases were not "sexual prefer-
145. Id. at 13-14.
146. Id. at 14 (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)).
147. Brief for Appellant at 15.
148. 566 F.2d at 663.
149. Id. at 664.
150. Id.
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ence" cases. 15' The Holloway majority suggested that transsexuals who
claimed discrimination because of their sex, male or female, would
clearly state a cause of action under Title VII. Holloway's claim, how-
ever, was not actionable under Title VII, as she did not claim to have
been discriminated against because she was male or female. Rather,
she was discriminated against because she was a transsexual who chose
to change her sex.
The dissenting judge suggested that if the employer had waited to
discharge Holloway as a postsurgical female because she had changed
her sex, the majority would have classified the termination as one based
upon sex.' 52 Judge Goodwin could see no valid Title VII purpose to be
served by distinguishing between discharges while an employee is in
surgery or a few days before surgery. "The result is the same, when-
ever the employer sends the discharge notice." 153
To the dissent, then, the relevant issue is not whether plaintiff was
born female or was born ambiguous and chose to become a female, but
that she was fired for having become female under controversial cir-
cumstances. That the employer contends that these circumstances are
disconcerting to other employees ought to be determined in court by
trial on the merits. 54
As Judge Goodwin's dissenting opinion suggests, the majority has
created a precarious distinction between transsexuals who claim dis-
crimination because of their sex, male or female, and those who have
been treated discriminatorily because he or she is a transsexual who
chose to change his or her sex. This apparent majority view would
deny all protection to the preoperative transsexual while allowing post-
operatives to state valid Title VII claims. 5 5 A preoperative Powell
could be discharged because a customer informed her supervisor that
she was "really" a male. A postoperative Powell theoretically could not
be discharged if someone pointed her out as a former male.
151. Id.
152. Id. (Goodwin, J., dissenting). The court did not allow plaintiff to amend her com-
plaint from one that claimed discharge for undertaking a course of medical treatment to
achieve a future sex change to one claiming discharge "for becoming a female." 566 F.2d at
665 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 664.
154. Judge Goodwin consequently did not address the alleged constitutional argument.
He found that Holloway should be entitled to win or lose on the statutory claim, depending
upon the particular circumstances of her condition and whatever "adverse impact" could be
proven by the employer. Id.
155. But cf Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., II Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,686
(D.N.J. 1975) aflJd, 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (postoperative
elementary school teacher discharged).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
Whether that postoperative protection would extend only to those
persons discriminated against because of their new sex rather than for
the revelation of their former status remains unanswered. The reluc-
tance of the Powell court to recognize factual nuances in the decisions
and the denial of certiorari in the Grossman federal litigation do not
indicate an expansive interpretation of the Holloway- Voyles inroad.
State Case Law
The issue of employment discrimination and the transsexual was
first raised on the state level in In re Tenure Hearing of Grossman.'56 A
male-to-female transsexual had been a tenured elementary school
teacher for over ten years when she was suspended without pay by the
local board of education after sex-reassignment surgery. The board
predicated its action on five charges: (1) her presence as a teacher had
created and would continue to create a degree of sensation and notori-
ety within the system and the community that would severely impair
the Board's ability to conduct an efficient and orderly school system; (2)
under the circumstances of the case, including the failure to disclose the
condition and anticipated surgery, Mrs. Grossman had exhibited con-
duct unbecoming a teacher; (3) as a result of the sex-reassignment sur-
gery, Mrs. Grossman underwent a fundamental and complete change
in her role and identification, thereby rendering herself incapable of
continuing to function as the male who had been engaged as a teacher
by the Board; (4) Mrs. Grossman exhibited conduct and behavior devi-
ant from the acceptable standards of the community; and (5) she exhib-
ited abnormality. 57
The State Commissioner of Education found against the local
board on all five charges, but upheld the dismissal on the ground that
Grossman rendered "'himself [sic] incapable to teach children. . . be-
cause of the potential her (Grossman's) presence in the classroom
presents for psychological harm to the students". 58 Relying on Cali-
fornia tenure cases,159 the New Jersey court found the threat of psycho-
logical harm to children of elementary school age to be sufficient
incapacity to approve dismissal. The court concluded that there was
156. 127 N.J. Super. 13, 316 A.2d 39 (1974).
157. Id. at 20, 316 A.2d at 42.
158. Id. at 27, 316 A.2d at 42 (emphasis deleted). See generaly A Faltering Response,
supra note 6, at 328-32 (discussion of Grossman rationale).
159. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, 16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318
(1971); Commings v. State Bd. of Educ., 23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1972); Morri-
son v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
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sufficient credible evidence to support the Commissioner's hypothesis
that it was reasonably probable that the children would suffer emo-
tional harm. 160
The California courts did not face a similar issue until a petition
for writ of mandate was filed on behalf of a tenured California school
teacher who was absent from his assigned employment for a six-month
period in order to participate in a gender-change program. In Dain v.
Commission of Professional Competence,'6 1 the commission had ac-
cused petitioner of falsely claiming absence for illness, transporting stu-
dents outside of the district without parental consent, and conducting
unauthorized sex lectures on campus. Upon review, the court found
that the weight of the evidence supported the finding that Dain en-
gaged in substantial and material deception constituting dishonesty
within the meaning of section 44932(c) of the California Education
Code, 162 and thus was appropriately discharged. Further, there was no
abuse of discretion found in the Commission's failure to sustain a sec-
tion 44932(a) 163 immoral conduct charge. Allegations that Dain's pres-
ence as a certificated employee would present "potential psychological
harm to pupils" were properly dismissed by the commission, as were
similar allegations concerning "potential disruption to the education
process." 164
The status of the two state court decisions is thus mixed. Based on
a California tenure precedent, a New Jersey elementary school teacher
may properly be dismissed for undergoing gender-correction surgery.
A California secondary teacher may not be similarly terminated, but
must endeavor to reveal fully the reasons for leave. Of course, in the
private employment context, such disclosure of the intent to undergo
sex change has been found to be unprotected by federal and state em-
ployment laws.
The murkiness of the Grossman and Dain decisions is accentuated
by the potential or actual legislation aimed at homosexual conduct.
Consider, for example, the recent California ballot initiative 65 which
would have provided for possible dismissal of teachers who "have en-
160. 127 N.J. Super. at 27, 316 A.2d at 46.
161. No. 505629-3 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County, July 7, 1978).
162. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44932 (West 1978) provides: "No permanent employee shall
be dismissed except for one or more of the following causes: . . . . (c) Dishonesty."
163. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44932(a) (West 1978).
164. No. 505629-3 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County, July 7, 1978).
165. Ballot Initiative No. 6, California General Election, November 7, 1978 (the so-
called "Briggs Initiative," defeated by a wide margin).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
gaged in public homosexual activity or public homosexual conduct."'166
The proposal defined "public homosexual activity" as the commission
of specified acts, described in certain sections of the California Penal
Code, upon any other person of the same sex, which is not discrete or
not practiced in private, whether or not a crime.1 67 "Public homosex-
ual conduct" refers to the advocating, soliciting, imposing, encourag-
ing, or promoting of private or public homosexual activity directed at
or likely to come to the attention of school children or school employ-
ees.' 68 To the transsexual teacher or school district employee whose
status is not universally defined or recognized, such prohibitions could
pose a further source of employment limitation. The sexual conduct
prohibited could vary temporarily for the individual depending upon
his or her preoperative or postoperative status.
State Fair Employment Practice Acts
Protection under state fair employment practices acts is similarly
tenuous. Although numerous state statutes provide protection against
employment discrimination based on sex, 169 there is every indication
166. Id.
167. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286, 288a (West 1970 & Supp. 1978) which define and
make criminal some acts of sodomy and oral copulation.
168. Ballot Initiative No. 6, California General Election, November 7, 1978.
169. See ALAS. STAT. § 18.80.220 (Supp. 1977); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (West
Supp. 1977); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-306
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 13.261 (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1976);
IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 853 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND.
CODE § 22-9-1-2(b) (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6 (West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1009 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. § 344.040 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4572 (West
Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19 (Supp. 1977); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15 1B,
§ 4 (1971); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (West Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.03 (1) (West Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296.020 (Vernon Supp. 1978); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 64-301 (Supp. 1977); NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 48-1104 (1977); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 613.330 (1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-4 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(l)(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02
(Page Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (West Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.022 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-
7 (Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-10 (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 34-35-6 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.60.180 (Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31-
.325 (West 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105 (1977). Other states provide protection lim-
ited to state service or employment with contractors of a state. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 38:2315 (West 1977); S.C. CODE § 8-11-230 (3) (1976); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-16 (Vernon Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 2.1-374-376 (Supp. 1977). Others provide protec-
tion against sex discrimination in wages only. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-624 (1976); GA.
CODE ANN. § 54-1003 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-
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that the Voyles-Holloway guidelines precluding transsexuals from stat-
utory protection 70 are being followed at the state level.
In one recent example, the California Fair Employment Practice
Commission ruled that protection against employment discrimination
based on sexual preference did not lie with the commission, but was
rather a matter for the legislature.' 7' Citing Voyles, inter alia, the
Commission found that "there was no reason either in language or leg-
islative intent to warrant an interpretation of the California FEP Act
which would apply to discrimination based on sexual preference.' 7 2
Further, there was no violation of the state or federal equal protection
clause by the absence of a forum for discrimination based on sex
preference. 173
Although no state fair-practice decisions have directly faced the
question of protection of gender dysphoric persons, there is little cause
for optimism that a broader interpretation of these state "sex discrimi-
nation" laws will be extended to these individuals.
Need for Reinterpretation of Sex Discrimination
The futility of the transsexual discriminatee's predicament is un-
derscored by the adverse decisions in state and federal courts. The
1974 EEOC determination 74 against Grossman was later decided at
the state level with the hint of an "adverse impact" standard. 75 In
1975, the district court in Voyles granted jurisdiction, but then recanted
and dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief.176 That decision
was then cited as precedent in the Holloway17 7 and Powe1 78 district
court decisions. Holloway later became the first such decision affirmed
by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals 179 and was thus binding on
321 (1977). Only two states, Alabama and Mississippi, appear to have no protection against
discrimination in employment based on sex.
170. See notes 127-55 & accompanying text supra.
171. Memorandum in Response to the In re Pride Foundation Petition to the F.E.P.C.
(1976), at 30.
172. Id. at 8. Here the Commission reflects the general confusion of the distinction be-
tween transsexualism and sexual orientation.
173. Id. at 23.
174. 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6499 (EEOC Dec. No. 75-030 1974).
175. 127 N.J. Super. at 24, 316 A.2d at 44.
176. Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
ajJd, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978). See notes 128-32 & accompanying text supra.
177. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., No. 76-2248 (N.D. Cal. April 6, 1976).
178. Powell v. Read's Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977).
179. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
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the Voyles appeal which was also heard by the Ninth Circuit. 180 Subse-
quent EEOC and FEPC decisions, in turn, relied on Voyles and
Holloway.'8' The United States Supreme Court dealt with the subject
only by its summary denial of certiorari in the Grossman federal
case. 182
Although the United States Supreme Court has shown a tendancy
to allow lower courts to have the final say on important Title VII cases,
the Voyles line of cases reveal a need for consistency. 8 3 The lack of
clarity and uniformity in lower court definitions of this medical phe-
nomenon suggests the propriety of reevaluation. The need for further
judicial consideration is particularly appropriate in cases where (1) it is
unclear whether the alleged discrimination was a result of the employ-
ers' attitudes toward the transexual's postoperative gender or merely to
the operation itself,184 (2) where the decisions rely upon the inexacti-
tude of the medical data concerning transsexualism, or (3) where the
lower court expressed doubt about the medical necessity of the proce-
dures involved.
Such a review could logically follow that line of cases which inter-
preted a much broader congressional policy underlying Title VII, to
wit, the need to assure equality of employment opportunities so that
anyone can have access to the job market without being subject to dis-
parate treatment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. 8 5 Although it was the deprivation of the right of women to enjoy
challenging, responsible employment at pay equal to that of men that
prompted enactment of Title VII's anti-sex-discrimination provi-
sions, 86 federal courts have found that the legislature intended to cover
all individuals who were discriminated against because of their sex, and
not merely women. 8 7
When it later amended Title VII in 1972, Congress openly dis-
180. 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aft'd, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
18 1. See, e.g., Memorandum in Response to the In re Pride Foundation Petition to the
F.E.P.C. (1976), at 10.
182. 429 U.S. 897 (1976).
183. See Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment
Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69 (opening comments).
184. See notes 152-53 & accompanying text supra.
185. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Phillips v. Martin Mari-
etta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1972); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); 110 CONG. REC. 2577, 2578, 7213; H. Rep. No. 914,
88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2401.
186. Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 n.2 (9th Cir. 1974).
187. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971); H. Rep. No. 914, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2401.
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cussed and decried the pervasiveness of sex discrimination in employ-
ment practices over the previous decade. 88 Accordingly, in an effort to
strengthen its effectiveness, the 1972 amendment made several proce-
dural changes regarding enforcement of the Act. 189
Thus, employment decisions to discharge transsexuals who have
either undergone or are about to undergo corrective surgery can be
seen as violative of the strong congressional policy to neutralize sex as a
factor in employment. Since the discrimination complained of may
wholly revolve around the existing condition or status of one's sex, ie.,
femaleness or maleness trapped inside a female or male body, it is ine-
luctable that by definition adverse employment decisions necessarily
entailed the proscribed factor.
Moreover, for several reasons, congressional silence regarding pro-
tection for transsexual individuals should not be an overriding consid-
eration. First, from a purely practical viewpoint, it is humanly
impossible for legislators to contemplate or discuss every set of circum-
stances that could arise under a given statute. There is ample precedent
for courts to consider what answer the legislature would have made to a
problem that was neither discussed nor contemplated. 90
Second, congressional silence on the type of claim presented in the
Voyles line of cases might well dictate judicial intervention because of
the recent development of this medical-psychological phenomenon.
Because of the stigma attached to this small, powerless minority,' 9' the
judiciary should be more sympathetic to the transsexual's employment
discrimination claim. 192
Third, it is a longstanding and fundamental principle that legisla-
tive acts will be given a construction that avoids doubts as to their con-
188. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973); [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2137.
189. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir.), vacated 424
U.S. 737 (1975); H. Rep. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2137.
190. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 445 F.2d 739
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406
F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also note 243 & accompanying text infra.
191. Congressional unfamiliarity with transsexualism and the group's neglible political
power has been recently demonstrated by legislative attempts to amend Title VII to include
"sexual preference or orientation," but not transsexualism. See note 139 & accompanying
text supra.
192. Cf Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572 (1976).
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stitutionality.' 93 To the extent that transsexuals stand as a "discrete
and insular minority," express congressional exclusion of transsexual
individuals from protection from discrimination in employment under
Title VII might well raise substantial equal protection problems.
Where congress has not expressed such an intention, the judiciary is
encouraged to construe a statute to avoid constitutional questions. 94
As Mr. Justice Traynor has eloquently stated:
In his quite different responsibility of assuring the rational continuity
of the law, a judge may now and again be compelled by reason to
arrive at an innovative decision, in the honorable tradition of ances-
tral precedent-setters. Such a decision exemplifies judicial responsi-
bility at its most challenging. The innovative decision is the most
difficult for a judge to elucidate, for it usually concerns a controversy
that has compelled him to evaluate conflicting interests in terms of a
changing social or economic context. He is himself in the moving
picture of that change, but must somehow view it dispassionately.
That perspective he can achieve only by a long look at the past, in
terms of the present, to evaluate whether once useful precedents are
impaired by obsolescence, or whether there are no useful precedents,
and then by a long look at the present in terms of the future, to eval-
uate what the long-range prospects of currently visible change are. 195
There is a need now for jurists who fit Justice Traynor's concept of
the actively analytical judge sufficiently alert to set limits on judicial
creativity, yet still able to preserve the distance between judicial analy-
sis and legislative analysis. 96 Such a judge would merely seek to con-
form the law to the now-accepted medical opinion. 97
Impact of Reinterpretation
Recognition of the transsexual person's claim would not have sig-
nificant and sweeping implications for the courts or the average citizen
because there are so few transsexuals in the United States. It is difficult
to see, in view of the small numbers involved, how a ruling favorable to
193. See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106
(1948).
194. See Ashwander v. Tennesee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
195. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1034 (1978).
196. Id.
197. A similar theme was articulated at an earlier date by Justice Cardozo: "Restate-
ment will clear the ground of debris. It will enable us to reckon our gains and losses, strike a
balance and start afresh. This is an important, an almost inestimably important, service.
But hereafter, as before, the changing combinations of events will beat upon the walls of
ancient categories .... Existing rules and principles can give us our present location, our
bearings, our latitude and longitude. The inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's
end. The law, like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow. It must have a principle of
growth." B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 19-20 (1924).
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the dischargees would "open the floodgates" to multitudinous litiga-
tion. The courts would not necessarily have to consider claims of em-
ployment discrimination made on the basis of sexual preference or
orientation not presently covered by Title VII.198 Discharges resulting
from revelation of one's status as a transsexual person would be per-
missible insofar as the employer can justify the practice consistent with
defenses recognized in other employment discrimination contexts. 199
The judicial denial of Title VII relief to transsexual persons is tan-
tamount to a denial of access to the private job market simply because
of a status created by an accident of birth.200 Presumably, individuals
suffering from other gender conditions such as Turner's syndrome, 20'
male pseudohermaphrodism, and androgen insensitivity2 2 syndrome
would also be denied relief. To opine that their predicament is a tem-
poral one-overcome by the passage of time or change of residence-is
to ignore the impact of the current majority view. No employer is pres-
ently prohibited from revealing the preoperative name and gender to
prospective employers. No personnel department is required, as re-
quested by Voyles, to conform old records to the new status. 20 3 Even
emerging legislation prescribing alteration of birth certificates would
not effect the condition of the jobless, or the jobseekers.
Thus it is an opportune time to reconsider the majority view in
light of new medical and biological technology related to the phenome-
non of transsexualism. It is even more opportune where, as here, reli-
ance upon various legislative bodies is utopian given the emotive
nature of the subject matter, the diminutive size of the pressure group,
and the historical reluctance of legislatures to enact sex-discrimination
statutes.
198. See Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd. 569
F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
199. See generally Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimination in Employment, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 495 (1976).
200. It is particularly unfortunate since it is based upon an artificial distinction between
"sex" discrimination and discrimination based upon one's "gender identity."
201. Turner's syndrome is a condition in which a sterile female exhibits an XO chromo-
some pattern as opposed to the usual female XX pattern. See J. MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF
THE BODY 17 (1968).
202. Androgen insensitivity, or testicular feminization, is a biological anomaly in which
a person is bom with the male XY chromosome pattern but, through insensitivity to male
hormone, androgen, does not develop other sex characteristics associated with maleness, i.e.
the individual has a vagina, breasts and other feminine external appearances. See id. at 32.
203. Reporter's Transcript at 124-25, Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F.
Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), af'd, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Alternative Approaches
A compelling argument has been made for the protection of
transsexual individuals under existing fair employment statutes
designed to curb discrimination on the basis of sex. Nevertheless, the
realization of such protection will require a major reversal of the trend
to deny coverage at the threshold level. Absent this event, it is impera-
tive to look elsewhere for legal remedies.
Constitutional Protection
As postulated in the complaint in one pending federal civil ac-
tion,2° an employment policy which disqualifies one from employment
on the basis of a change in sex may be violative of the employee's right
to procedural and substantive due process as guaranteed by the United
States Constitution.20 5
In Clark v. Brown, a postoperative transsexual enlisted in the
Army Reserves. She was separated from the Army and her enlistment
was voided pursuant to Army Regulation 40-501, paragraph 2-14S
which provides that:
An individual with abnormalities and defects of the genitalia such as
a change in sex is disqualified for enlistment. It is the Department of
the Army policy not to waive this disqualification due to the require-
ment for continuing maintenance therapy and the high incidence of
psychological problems associated with the condition.20 6
Because of the Army's invocation of A.R. 40-501, paragraph 2-
14S, Clark was terminated from her civilian employment as Staff
Training Assistant because the position was contingent upon her con-
tinuing membership in the United States Army Reserves. 20 7
By recent letter,20 8 the Department of the Army has conceded that
Clark did not fail to disclose pertinent information regarding her
transsexual status upon enlistment, but that Army Reserve personnel
had committed administrative errors ab initio. Yet, the Department of
the Army has persisted in its opinion that "enlistment of transsexuals
would not be in the best interest of the individual or the Army.
Transsexuals are not considered psychologically or sociologically
suited for military service, and they require continuing sophisticated
204. Clark v. Brown, No. 78-0663 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 17, 1978).
205. Id. at 3.
206. Id., Exhibit 1.
207. Id. at 4.
208. Letter from Dep't of the Army to Mr. Edwin F. Clark, (Dec. 21, 1977) (on file with
The Hastings Law Journal).
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medical care because of the absence of organs and glands normally
present in an individual at birth. ' 20 9 A decision has yet to be rendered
by the district court.
The theory espoused by Clark is akin to the recent "irrebuttable
presumption" 210 cases which render offending employment classifica-
tions unconstitutional. In Gurmankin v. Costanzo,21 1 the court held un-
constitutional a Philadelphia school district policy of denying blind
persons jobs as teachers of sighted students. 212 The refusals by the dis-
trict to permit Ms. Gurmankin to take a qualifying examination vio-
lated due process by subjecting her to an irrebuttable presumption that
her blindness made her incompetent to teach sighted students.
Citing Gurmankin, a district court213 held that the City of Philadel-
phia's hearing practices regarding job applicants with prior histories of
drug abuse violated the equal protection 214 and due process clauses215
of the United States Constitution because the regulation did not con-
sider the merits of each individual's application. 216 The court thus re-
quired the city to make individual evaluations of each applicant's
qualifications in light of the demands of the position in question.
Similarly, the transsexual individual separated from or denied em-
ployment by state or federal law or regulations should not be presumed
unfit merely by virtue of transsexualism. Although a hearing may be
appropriate to determine the fitness of a particular transsexual person,
any policy denying employment or service opportunities because of the
categorization as transsexual would be in violation of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Recent criteria employed by the United States Supreme Court in
determining the justification for employment classifications, rather than
individualized determinations, would also seem to favor the Clark po-
sition.217 As Mr. Justice White has stated:
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
See also Perry, Constitutional "Fairness" Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process, 63 VA.
L. REV. 383 (1977).
211. 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), a f'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
212. The court relied on the rationale of Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974).
213. Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
214. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
215. U.S. CONST. amend V.
216. 451 F. Supp. at 801.
217. See Perry, Constitutional "Fairness Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process, 63
VA. L. REV. 383, 409-10 (1977).
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[I]t must now be obvious, or has been all along, that, as the Court's
assessment of the weight and value of the individual interest esca-
lates, the less likely it is that mere administrative convenience and
avoidance of hearings 6r investigations will be sufficient to justify
what otherwise would appear to be irrational discrimination.
218
The Clark problem arguably presents one of extreme importance
to the private individual-to wit, economic livelihood. The classifica-
tion involved is an expansive one which applies to all transsexual per-
sons whether or not these individuals require continuing maintenance
therapy or suffer from psychological problems associated with the con-
dition. Administrative hearings are readily available to make determi-
nations on an individual basis. Thus, an adjudicative procedure to
determine the fitness of the individual, parallel to the judicial determi-
nation to hear economic justifications formulated in defense to Title
VII litigation, would be appropriate to determine on an individual ba-
sis the nexus between fitness for public employment and
transsexualism. 219
Protection for the Handicapped
Discrimination in the employment of disabled individuals has
been well established. 220 Gradually many states have recognized this
problem, seeking remedies through inclusion of the disabled in existing
fair employment laws or enactment of separate statutes.221 Congress
218. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973) (concurring opinion).
219. The substantive section of the Equal Rights Amendment reads: "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex." Passage of this law may well add impetus to the constitutional foundation
of the problem of transsexual based discrimination. As one commentator has opined: "The
Amendment would eliminate the historical impediment to judicial recognition of the legal
equality of men and women: the absence of any intention by eighteenth and nineteenth-
century Constitution-makers to deal with gender-based discrimination. It would add to the
text of the Constitution a principle under which a more complete and coherent opinion
pattern may be developed." Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974
Terms, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 23. Although questions regarding definitions of "sex" and
"gender-based" discrimination may persist, the ERA is apt to hasten the process of eliminat-
ing sex classification not substantially related to a legitimate economic purpose. See also
Karst, Foreward Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1,
54 (1977).
220. Rickard, Triandis & Patterson, Indices of Employer Prejudice Toward Disabled
Applicants, 47 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 52 (1963). See also S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 17, 50, 58, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 6373, 6400, 6408 [herein-
after cited as S. REP. No. 1297]; 118 CONG. REC. 525-26 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey);
42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977) (overwhelming evidence that handicapped excluded from pro-
grams or denied equal treatment); Note, Equal Employment and the Disabled.'A Proposal, 10
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 457 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Equal Employment].
221. See notes 311-35 & accompanying text infra.
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has responded as well by providing some employment protection under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.222
Whether transsexuals will benefit by these employment protections
will depend upon a legal determination of the definition of handi-
capped. In the absence of legislative definitions a tribunal may well
fashion its own definition from a general understanding of "disability"
and "handicap." Although the terms are commonly used interchangea-
bly, and are so used in this Article, a distinction profitably may be
drawn. " 'A disability is a condition of impairment, physical or
mental, having an objective aspect that can usually be described by a
physician . . . A handicap is the cumulative result of the obstacles
which disability interposes between the individual and his maximum
functional level.' "223
"[Tihe cultural definition of disability, rather than the scientific or
medical definition, . . is instrumental in ascription of capacities and
incapacities, roles and rights, status and security. ' 224 Misconceptions,
then, can become "facts" upon which to terminate or deny employment
of persons who have an otherwise limited and nonproblematical medi-
cal condition. 225 Relying on "an assumptive framework of myths, ste-
reotypes, aversive responses, and outright prejudices," 226 professional
normals tend to "impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis of
222. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976)) as
amended by Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978). See notes 242-306 & accompanying
text infra. Proposed amendment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of handicap repeatedly fails. See, e.g., H.R. 461 & H.R. 1107,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H 193, H209 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1977). See generally
Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26 EMORY L.J. 65, 65-
66 n.2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wright]; Note, Potluck Protections for Handicapped Dis-
criminatees." The Need to Amend Title V11 to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of
Disability, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 814, 835 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Potluck Protections].
223. tenBroek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 809,
814 (1966) (quoting HAMILTON, COUNSELING THE HANDICAPPED IN THE REHABILITATION
PROCESS 17 (1950)).
224. Id. See also Cook, szqra note 72, at 47-48.
225. One commentator put it: "There are many different types of physical and mental
disabilities which cause hardship in obtaining employment. The disabled all have the prob-
lem that they possess various physical or mental conditions which trigger persistent fears in
employers. . . . Consequently the disabled suffer when seeking employment." Equal Em-
ployment, supra note 220, at 495. Such discrimination has been analogized to that faced by
racial minorities and alien groups. See S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 220, at 38, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6389; Hull, Foreward-The Specter of Equality:
Reflections on the Civil Rights of Physically Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 944, 946
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Hull]; tenBroek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 809, 814-15 (1966).
226. tenBroek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 809,
814 (1966).
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the original one."227
That this is the employment experience of many individuals with
gender dysphoria has been documented. 228 Societal stigmatization 229
transforms the impairment from an otherwise medically manageable
disability2 30 into a major handicap in need of special legal treatment.2 31
Judges and administrators have classified transsexual individuals
as handicapped or disabled in contexts other than fair employment. 232
Theoretically, and in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary,
the application of this classification would transfer smoothly to provide
coverage under laws protecting handicapped individuals from discrimi-
nation. Insofar as the medical and legal profession is disposed to in-
clude transsexual persons within the designation of handicapped, they
would logically be foreseen to afford these same individuals the identi-
cal protection afforded to the general category.
The theory presupposes that tribunals will not fail to find that gen-
der dysphoric persons qualify as "handicapped" for want of sufficient
diagnostic information. 233 The handicap must not be characterized as
227. Hull, supra note 225, at 947 (quoting E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MAN-
AGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 947 (1963)).
228. See notes 115-17 & accompanying text supra.
229. See Stiirup, Male Transsexuals: A Long-Term Follow-up After Sex Reassignment
Operations, 53 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 51, 61 (1976) (severe stress due to stig-
matization). For a discussion of stigma see Hull, supra note 225, at 946-47.
230. Regarding the impairment as described by physicians and others, see notes 6, 14-29
& accompanying text supra. It should be emphasized that, when treated early, the physical
and mental impairment associated with gender dysphoria would normally be minimal. For
example, and contrary to the uninformed view, most transsexuals are not psychotic. See E.
DE SAVITSCH, HOMOSEXUALITY, TRANSVESTISM AND CHANGE OF SEX 95 (1958); Green &
Money, supra note 6, at 471; Benjamin, supra note 10, at 75; Roback, Strassberg, McKee &
Cunningham, Self- Concept and Psychological Adjustment Dffierences Between Self-Identfied
Male Transsexuals and Male Homosexuals, 3 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 15 (1977).
23 1. In describing the preoperative transsexual as "handicapped," one health profes-
sional recently commented that "[s]uch persons. . . are limited in their capacity to socially
interact, or work, with others, due, in part, to the (1) prejudice of society against such per-
sons, (2) the lack of legal identification (sex and name) congruent to their socially presented
sex, and (3) the need to reestablish themselves with new work, academic, and credit histo-
ries, in some cases." Walker Letter, supra note 94.
232. See, e.g., In re Grossman, 157 N.J. Super. 165, 384 A.2d 855 (Super. Ct. 1978)
(pension benefits granted to postoperative transsexual elementary school teacher "incapaci-
tated" by virtue of sex reassignment surgery); Doe v. State, Dep't Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d
816, 817-18 (Minn. 1977) (Doe certified as totally disabled); Denise R. v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d
279, 283, 347 N.E.2d 893, 896, 383 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570-71 (1976) (condition interferes with
capacity for normal activity).
233. Basically, this has been HEW's approach toward rehabilitation services. See notes
85-93 & accompanying text supra. Ironically, however, HEW specifically includes in its
§ 504 definition of physical and mental impairments "any condition which is mental or
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insignificant, not deserving special treatment. 234 The presumption is
buttressed by analogy to governmental guidelines relating to alcohol-
ism and drug addiction. For example, in declaring alcoholism and
drug addiction handicaps for purposes of section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, the HEW regulations state that "[tihere is a medical and legal
consensus that [they] are diseases, although there is disagreement as to
whether they are primarily mental or physical." 235 Similarly, transsex-
ualism can be considered both a physical and mental disease.236 Con-
ceivably, it could be argued that transsexuals suffer from a purely
mental condition, the result of postnatal environmental conditioning.2 37
Conversely, the purely physical aspects could be stressed by relying on
theories of neuroendocrinological error.238 Both mental and physical
aspects might be discounted by reference to the scientific doubt about
the origins of gender dysphoria.
A general knowledge of handicaps and their relationship to gender
dysphoria should provide the foundation for decision making, while
the rights afforded an individual transsexual petitioner may well de-
pend ultimately upon the specific statutory language invoked.
Three cautions are urged. First, as a specific disease or condition,
gender dysphoria is a relatively recent phenomena. Thus, few govern-
mental entities have had cause to officially classify transsexual individ-
uals as handicapped. This circumstance should be of little importance
to a judge. It has been stated:
physical but whose precise nature is not at present known." 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A(3)
(1977).
234. The comments of the HEW committee hint that the handicaps of transsexual indi-
viduals may not be "severe." See note 87 & accompanying text supra. In a different context,
one state supreme court judge expressed similar sentiment in reversing the right of transsex-
uals to amend birth certificates. He stated that the court should not have granted certiorari
since the case did not "present any issue of importance." K. v. Department of Human Re-
sources, 277 Or. 371, 378, 560 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1977) (Denecke, C.J., concurring). Presuma-
bly the health welfare of this small minority would be a sacrifice to judicial efficiency.
235. 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A(4) (1977). But see Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services,
and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2985
(1978) (to be codified in 29 U.S.C. § 706(6)). See also Cook, supra note 72, at 47 n.99.
236. An important point is made by one scholar who finds the discrimination against
disabled people is similar to that suffered by racial minorities. He suggests that "the distinc-
tion between physical disabilities and socially-caused handicaps is not useful in determining
what government can do to establish and protect equal rights for handicapped people. Per-
haps the difficulty arises because the suggested distinction focuses on the cause or origins of
handicaps, a question which is largely irrelevant to the demands disabled people have made in
their quest for equal rights under the law." Hull, supra note 225, at 946-47 (emphasis
added).
237. See note 10 supra.
238. See note 10 supra.
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[M]embership in the class of handicapped people can be determined
by the diagnoses of professionals in the fields of psychology,
medicine, and education. If a person can be shown to meet the crite-
ria for one of the categories of recognized handicapping conditions,
then that individual is a 'handicapped person', even if the state has
not had occasion to so identify that person.239
Thus, the focus should be on the stated criteria, rather than the history
of gender dysphoria.
Second, it is unlikely that gender dysphoria was ever contemplated
in passage of these statutes. Certainly none of them specifically men-
tion the disease. Legislators, in apparent recognition of the countless
possible disabling conditions, have rejected a catalogue approach to
coverage; 240 most statutes carry only a general, and often vague, defini-
tion of disabled or no definition at all.24 '
This general approach is in keeping with the apparent commit-
ment of legislatures to "end discrimination on the basis of handi-
cap. ' 242 A specific handicap need not have been contemplated. It is
axiomatic "that courts should endeavor to give statutory language that
meaning that nurtures the policies underlying legislation." 243 Thus, the
protected minority class should remain open, affording aggrieved
transsexual people at least a modicum of hope.
Finally, the effect of finding a gender dysphoric individual handi-
capped for purposes of a given statute should be kept in perspective; it
239. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualications of
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 855, 860-61 (1975).
240. The statutory and regulatory definition of handicapped under the Rehabilitation
Act "does not set forth a list of specific diseases and conditions that constitute physical or
mental impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of any such
list." 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A(3) (1977). See also Comment, Toward Equal Rightsfor Handi-
capped Individuals: Judicial Enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 38
OHIO ST. L.J. 677, 685 (1977).
241. See note 325 infra. The omission of all definitions, however, may not provide em-
ployers with sufficient notice of statutory obligation. Such a statute may be held void for
vagueness. See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human
Rights Comm'n, [1976] 11 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 854 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1975). See also
Potluck Protections, supra note 222, at 838 n.151.
242. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977); Cook, supra note 72, at 39; note 268 & accom-
panying text infra.
243. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297 (1970). Justice Harlan goes on to warn
that "[c]are must be taken. . . to respect the limits up to which Congress was prepared to
enact a particular policy, especially when the boundaries of a statute are drawn as a compro-
mise resulting from countervailing pressures of other policies." Id. at 298. When one con-
siders that only handicapped persons capable of doing a given job will be protected, it is
difficult to imagine legitimate countervailing policies in operation here. See note 190 &
accompanying text supra.
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does not imply recovery against an employer. A petitioner still must
establish that he or she is qualified to perform the job.2 4 4 Moreover,
employers can defend by demonstrating that selection criteria or an
overt discriminatory practice is a valid "business necessity." 245
Federal Enployment Protection for Handicapped Individuals-Tile V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Congressional hearings held in consideration of proposed rehabili-
tation legislation provided extensive evidence that, inter alia, there had
been a lack of federal "action in areas related to rehabilitation which
limit a handicapped individual's ability to function in society, e.g. em-
ployment discrimination. '246 Title V of the Rehabilitation Act,2 4 7 then,
represents a remedial attack on this deficiency.
Section 50 1248 imposes on federal executive agencies a duty to es-
tablish and update an affirmative action policy for handicapped indi-
viduals. Regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission 249
pursuant to this section strengthen the existing nondiscrimination pol-
icy and statutory appeals system.250
Concerning private employers, section 503 mandates that contracts
entered into by the federal government in excess of $2,500 contain a
provision requiring contractors to "take affirmative action to employ
and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals." 211
Complaints of noncompliance are submitted to the Department of La-
bor.25 2 If informal attempts at resolution fail,25 3 judicial enforcement,
244. See notes 288-94 & accompanying text infra.
245. See notes 295-98 & accompanying text infra.
246. S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2076, 2078.
247. 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-794 (1976). Recent amendments provide, inter alia, discretionar)
award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services.
and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2983
(1978) (to be codified in 29 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2)).
248. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
249. 43 Fed. Reg. 12, 295-96 (1978) (to be codified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.701-.710).
250. See also 5 U.S.C. § 7153 (1976) (discrimination on the basis of physical handicap
prohibited in civil service). See general y Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and De-
velopmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 95 Stat. 2982 (1978) (to
be codified in 29 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1)).
251. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976). "Contractors" means private businesses whose only re-
ceipts of federal funds come from transactions in goods and services. See Rogers v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1977). See genera/h' Wright, supra note 218:
Note, Lowering the Barriers to Employment of the Handicapped: Affirmative Action Obliga-
tions Imposed on Federal Contractors, 81 DICK. L. REV. 174 (1976).
252. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976). Authority to prescribe regulations and responsibility for
enforcement of § 503 were placed in the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
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including injunctive relief254 and backpay,255 is available. There is no
express private right of action under section 503, and the existence of
an implied right is uncertain. 256
Finally, section 504257 sweeps broadest by codifying "the constitu-
tional right to equal protection ' 258 for handicapped people. It provides
that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual. . . shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ' 259 According to regula-
tions promulgated by HEW's Office of Civil Rights,260 the provision
proscribes disability-based employment discrimination. 26' Employer
recipients of federal monies262 who employ fifteen or more persons
(OFCCP) pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11,758, 3A C.F.R. § 116 (1974 Comp.), reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 8253. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.1-.54 (1977) for regula-
tions implementing § 503.
253. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28(a) (1977).
254. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28(b) (1977).
255. The Department of Labor apparently implies the availability of a backpay remedy.
See Wright, supra note 222, at 89 n.83.
256. See Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (refusing to imply a private cause of
action). See also Wright, supra note 222, at 89-96; cf. Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp.,
428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (indicating a right of action but invoking doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction and remanding to Dep't of Labor).
257. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
258. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1323 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
259. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
260. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1-.61 (1977). These regulations relate only to discrimination by re-
cipients of HEW assistance. Pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1976
Comp.), HEW has adopted general standards for other federal agencies to follow. See 43
Fed. Reg. 2132 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85.1-.58). Other federal agencies have
proposed or adopted regulations consistent with those of HEW. See Dep't of Transporta-
tion, 43 Fed. Reg. 25,016 (1978) (to be codified in 49 C.F.R. § 27); ACTION, 43 Fed. Reg.
19,883 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 1232); Veterans Adm'n, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,166
(1978) (to be codified in 38 C.F.R. § 18d); TVA, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,693 (1978) (to be codified in
18 C.F.R. § 307); HUD, 43 Fed. Reg. 16,652 (1978) (to be codified in 24 C.F.R. § 8).
261. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11-.14 (1977). See also S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 216, at 38,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6388-89. Before the HEW regulations
were published there was some question about whether employment discrimination was
covered. See, e.g., Equal Employment, supra note 220, at 466-68.
262. "Recipients" include individuals whose sole source of federal funds is Medicaid,
e.g., doctors and health facilities. Nonpublic elementary and secondary schools whose only
connection with federal assistance is their students' participation in federal programs are not
considered recipients; they are indirectly subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of
§ 504, however, through the application of§ 84.4(b)(1)(iv), which prohibits service to benefi-
ciaries of a recipient known to discriminate on the basis of handicap. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app.
A(l) (1977). See also Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (federal
financial assistance does not include procurement contracts).
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must adopt grievance procedures for handicapped individuals. 263 Fur-
ther, a department finding of discrimination subjects an employer to
remedial action: reinstatement, development of a remedial action plan,
termination of federal funds, or judicial sanctions can be granted. 264
Definition of Handicapped
Originally, the term "handicapped individual" was defined, for all
sections of the Act, as "any individual who (A) has a physical or mental
disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substan-
tial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to
benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation serv-
ices."' 265 The application of this definition to sections 503 and 504 im-
mediately proved troublesome because of its restrictive relation to
vocational rehabilitation services. 266 Congress had not intended to
limit the protected class in such a way, since section 504, for example,
"was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped indi-
viduals, regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from, voca-
tional rehabilitation services." 267
In order to embody this underlying intent,2 68 Congress expanded
263. 45 C.F.R. § 84.7 (1977). Regarding effective dates of the regulation, see 43 Fed.
Reg. 18,631-32 (1978).
264. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A(9) (1977). One of the most litigated issues under the Reha-
bilitation Act has been whether there is an implied private right of action under § 504. Most
cases have found such a right. See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d
1158 (4th Cir. 1978); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped
Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir.
1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Davis v. Bucher, 451
F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977);
Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. W. Va. 1976); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp.
180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976). Some courts have limited the right to judicial review after an ex-
haustion of administrative remedies. See NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453
F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978); Doe v. New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Crawford v. University of North Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (private
cause of action a serious question). But see Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2983 (1978)
(to be codified in 29 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2)). See generally Note, Enforcing Section 504 Regula-
tions." The Need for a Private Cause of Action to Remedy Discrimination Against the
Handicapped, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 345 (1978); Comment, Toward Equal Rights for Handi-
capped Individuals.: Judicial Enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 38
OHIO ST. L.J. 677 (1977).
265. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355 (1973)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 706(b) (1976)).
266. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 220, at 37, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6388.
267. Id. at 38, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6388.
268. Id., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6389.
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the definition of handicapped individual by amending the original, for
purposes of Titles IV and V, to mean one "who (A) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such per-
son's major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or
(C) is regarded as having such an impairment. 2 69 This amended defi-
nition, then, is based on the premise that disabled individuals may face
discrimination for a number of reasons. 270
Transsexual persons potentially meet this definition of handi-
capped in all three categories.27' Under category A, United States Civil
Service Commission regulations have characterized "physical or
mental impairment" as, inter alia "(1) any physiological disorder or
condition [or] cosmetic disfigurement. . . affecting one or more of the
following body systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal;. . . reproduc-
tive;. . . genito-urinary;. . . skin; and endocrine; or (2) any mental or
psychological disorder; such as . . . emotional or mental illness
.... 272 As discussedabove, current medical knowledge suggests that
gender dysphoria encompasses most, if not all, of these characteris-
tics.2 73 To isolate the dominant element, whether physiological or psy-
269. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974),
Pub. L. No. 93-651, 89 Stat. 2-3 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976)). See also
Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2985 (1978) (to be codified in 29 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2)).
270. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 220, at 38, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6389.
271. "[T]he Office for Civil Rights in Washington has to date issued no policy statement
regarding the application of Section 84.30) to individuals with a diagnosis of gender
dysphoria. Final policy determination in this matter must be reached by the Headquarters
office, to which we are referring this question for review." Letter from Hal M. Freeman,
Chief, Health & Social Services, HEW Regional Office, San Francisco, to authors (Septem-
ber 1, 1978) (on file with The HastingsLawJournal). Mr. Freeman went on to state that "an
individual suffering from gender dysphoria, established by medical diagnosis, could be de-
fined as a 'handicapped person' according to Section 84.30)(1) of the Regulation under Sec-
tion 504 if it could be shown that in fact this condition 'substantially limits one or more
major life activities.'" He also acknowledged the applicability of § 84.3(j)(1)(ii) and com-
mented that "given the prevailing attitudes of the general public at the present time, it is
likely that many transsexuals would be 'regarded as handicapped.'" Id. This is indeed an
enlightened view, a promising sign. But, in light of the tendency of administrative agencies
to reverse or reinterpret policy or opinions, it is too early to declare success.
272. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978) (to be codified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.702(b)). See
also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1977) (HEW regulations). The Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) will undoubtedly rely on HEW definitions since its own
regulations are not as complete. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977).
273. When rehabilitative sex reassignment is begun, the major impairment (gender iden-
tity incongruity) may be alleviated, but the treatment itself further affects most of the body
system. Insofar as postoperative transsexual individuals may be deemed "cured" by the
corrective surgery, they arguably could be perceived as handicapped by virtue of societal
perceptions of them as handicapped. Since it is precisely those persons whose preoperative
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chological, is unnecessary. 274 The transsexual individual may also
meet the criteria of category B, which includes a person who has a rec-
ord of an impairment. Such a person either has a history of, or has
been misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities. 275 In other words, an individual may
be completely recovered from an impairment, yet still be handicapped.
This category was "included because the attitude of employers, super-
visors, and coworkers toward that previous impairment may result in
an individual experiencing difficulty in securing, retaining, or advanc-
ing in employment." 276
The gender dysphoric individual misclassified as transsexual 277
would be afforded protection under category B, as would individuals
who may benefit from "cures" discovered in the future. Arguably,
however, this provision rarely would be utilized by preoperative
transsexual individuals, because the disorder has yet to be treated and
there has been no recovery.27 Postoperative individuals may be surgi-
cally rehabilitated but the diagnosis remains, and employers, supervi-
sors, and coworkers who learn of the previous surgery may reflect
intolerant attitudes. Thus, both preoperative and postoperative persons
could be perceived to have a primary impairment protected by category
A. To the extent that having a record extends to persons who have
recovered in part,2 7 9 the postoperative person could utilize category B
as well as category A.
Category C, regarded as having an impairment, means that
(1) . . . [the] impairment. . . does not substantially limit. . . but is
treated by an employer as constituting such a limitation; (2). . . [the]
impairment . . . substantially limits major life activities only as a
result of the attitude of an employer toward such impairment; (3) or
gender has been exposed to their detriment who might seek redress under these enactments,
this legislative protection would be all-encompassing.
274. See notes 233, 235-36 & accompanying text supra. HEW makes it clear that "envi-
ronmental, cultural, and economic disadvantage are not in themselves covered; nor are
prison records, age, or homosexuality. Of course, if a person who has any of these character-
istics also has a physical or mental handicap, the person is included within the definition of
handicapped person." 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A(3) (1977). Thus, even though transsexualism
may continue to be erroneously associated with homosexuality, the fact of additional handi-
cap should pull transsexual individuals squarely within the definition.
275. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii) (1977). See also 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978) (to be
codified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.702(d)).
276. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1977).
277. See note 4 supra.
278. See notes 34-37 & accompanying text supra.
279. This was surely the legislative intent. See S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 220, at 38,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6389.
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[one] has none of the impairments. . . but is treated by an employer
as having such an impairment. '280
If the major tenet that transsexual individuals have a physical or
mental impairment holds subsection (3) of category C is inapplicable.
If it is rejected, along with modem medical opinion, subsection (3) still
allows inclusion of transsexual discriminatees in the definition of
"handicapped."
As applied to employment discrimination, subsections (1) and (2)
of category C appear redundant and circular. If an impaired individ-
ual experiences employment difficulties, for whatever reason, one of his
major life activities is substantially limited;28' categories A and B cover
the situation. Yet, the worthy legislative intent to include individuals
who are discriminated against on the basis of handicap, whether or not
they are in fact handicapped, 282 is a guidepost to would-be statutory
interpretors. Transsexual persons should not be denied coverage on
medical or legal technicalities as long as their medical disorder pro-
vides the basis of mistreatment. In short, "[t]he key issue in a com-
plaint of discrimination is not the current or past nature or extent of a
handicap but whether an individual was discriminated against by an
employer."28 3
Once the impairment has been established under any of the three
categories, it is then necessary to demonstrate the substantial limitation
on an individual's major life activities. By regulation, such activities
include selfcare, socialization, and employment, with primary attention
given to their effect on employability.2 84 Further, any "handicapped
individual who is likely to experience difficulty in securing, retaining or
advancing in employment would be considered substantially lim-
ited."28 5 As a class, gender dysphorics would seem to fit this descrip-
tion.286 Only the exceptional individual experiences no employment or
280. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978) (to be codified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.702(e)). See
also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1977); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1977).
281. See note 285 & accompanying text infra.
282. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 216, at 39, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6389.
283. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,294 (1978) (Civil Service Commission discussing definition
of handicap for purposes of § 501).
284. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741, app. A (1977). See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1977); 43
Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978) (to be codified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.702(c)).
285. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1977). The Civil Service Commission draws no defini-
tion of "substantially limits" while HEW believes a definition is not yet possible. 45 C.F.R.
§ 84 app. A(3) (1977).
286. "It is true that many, if not most, of the transsexuals, especially male-to-female,
have experienced so much psychological distress prior to the inevitable decision to cross-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
socialization difficulty. 287
Qualified Handicapped Person Defined
In addition to satisfying one of the three categories of "handi-
capped" discussed above, a person claiming under Title V of the Act
must be "qualified. '288 This means that the handicapped person must
be able to perform the essential functions of the job in question.289 An
employer is bound, however, to make reasonable accommodation to
the known limitations of an applicant or employee unless the employer
can demonstrate undue hardship. 290
Qualification for a job, then, is a factual issue to be decided case-
by-case and is the analogue to the bona fide occupation qualification
defense utilized in Title VII cases.
The reasonable accommodation requirement could be important
to a transsexual petitioner in several ways. Should it be determined
that an employee undergoing sex-reassignment therapy would have an
adverse effect on other personnel, or pupils as in the case of a
teacher,291 and therefore would not be able to perform the job, the em-
ployer would be required to at least consider job restructuring, modifi-
cation of work assignment, and the like. 292 Further, an employer may
not deny employment opportunities if the need to make reasonable ac-
commodation is the sole basis for the denial.2 93 The misguided ration-
ale of needing separate restrooms, for example, would provide no
dress full-time, that they have poor work histories and may have been unable to work."
Walker Letter, supra note 94. See also notes 115-17 & accompanying text supra.
287. See note 94 supra.
288. See notes 250, 259 & accompanying text supra.
289. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978) (to be codified in 5
C.F.R. § 713.702(f)). The OFCCP regulations omit the word "essential." 41 C.F.R. § 60-
741.2 (1977). HEW believes, however, that in practice OFCCP treats the definition as if
"essential" were included.
290. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978) (to be codified in 5
C.F.R. § 713.704(a)); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977). See generally Cook, supra note 72, at
58-60; Lang, Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 703, 710-11
(1977); Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination,
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69, 163; Note, Lowering the Barriers to Employment of the Handicapped-
Affirmative Action Obligations Imposed on Federal Contractors, 81 DICK. L. REV. 174, 183-84
(1976).
291. Compare notes 156-64 & accompanying text supra.
292. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(2) (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978) (to be codified in
5 C.F.R. § 713.704(b)(2)). The regulations specify various criteria relevant to a determina-
tion of undue hardship. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978)
(to be codified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.704(c)); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977).




A violation of Title V does not turn on proof of intent to discrimi-
nate. Rather, it is the effect of discrimination that is prohibited.295 Ap-
plying principles established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,296 the implementing regulations proscribe the use of employment
tests or other selection criteria that tend to, or do, screen out some or all
classes of handicapped persons unless the criteria are proven job-relat-
ed and the responsible federal agency determines that no alternate pro-
cedures are available. 297 Procedurally, once a handicapped
complainant shows that his or her opportunities were limited in a given
selection process, the burden shifts to the employers to establish a
nexus between the criteria used and the job to be performed, that is, the
business necessity.298
The regulations, in combination with emerging case law,299 pro-
vide a comprehensive outline of the types of discriminatory practices
covered by the Act. The affirmative duty under section 503 to employ
and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals specifi-
cally includes areas such as promotion, hiring, and compensation. 300
Similarly, the section 504 regulation enumerates an open-ended array
of discriminatory employment practices301 and further imposes a duty
on employers to take "positive steps" 30 2 to insure full opportunity for
294. See generally EEOC Dec. No. 70-558, CCH EEOC Dec. 6137 (1973) (cost of
installing restroom & locker facilities for woman employee held not unreasonable in Title
VII sex discrimination case). But compare note 130 supra where Holloway's employer de-
cried the perturbance caused by the "misuse" of restroom facilities.
295. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(4) (1977).
296. Id. § 84 app. A(17). Particular reference is made to the standard enunciated in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See notes 132-34 & accompanying text
supra.
297. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a) (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978) (to be codified in 5
C.F.R. § 713.705(a)). The OFCCP regulations omit reference to the nonavailability of alter-
nate procedures. Arguably if other methods were feasible the discriminatory criteria would
be deemed inconsistent with "business necessity." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c) (1977).
298. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A(17) (1977); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(2) (1977).
299. See Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Gurmankin v.
Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), all'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977). See also
cases cited notes 256 & 264 supra.
300. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 (1977). For a detailed discussion of discriminatory practices
under § 503 see Wright, supra note 222, at 80-89.
301. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b) (1977). The prohibition applies to "[a]ny other term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment." 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b)(9) (1977). For a disucssion of dis-
ciminatory practices under § 504, see Cook, supra note 72, at 49-58.
302. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 1(a)(2) (1977). Another section of the regulationpermits employers
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disabled people. Although the scope of discriminatory activities under
section 501 is not as well defined, comparable activities should be cov-
ered since, as a model employer,30 3 the federal government cannot re-
quire less of itself than it requires of the private sector.3°4
These provisions are, to a greater or lesser degree, typical of fair
employment legislation. The Act, however, provides additional protec-
tion unique to the needs of disabled persons. Preemployment inquiries
often serve no legitimate interest, but are used to discriminate against
handicapped people.30 5 Therefore, in the preemployment process, an
employer is limited to questions concerning an applicant's ability to
perform the job in question in a safe, efficient manner. 30 6 No direct
inquiry about the nature or severity of impairments is permitted.
Moreover, an offer of employment can be conditioned on the outcome
of medical examination only if all applicants are subjected to such an
examination and the results are used nondiscriminatorily. 30 7 The regu-
lations further mandate postemployment confidentiality regarding an
employee's condition. 308
For the transsexual applicant this requirement is particularly use-
ful. Most gender dysphoric individuals seek to blend quietly into soci-
ety, seeking rehabilitative acceptance by masking all traces of the
disorder.309 Generally their impairment is not readily apparent nor
does it adversely affect job performance. The struggle for privacy,
then, could be successful but for unnecessary inquiries which force dis-
to take voluntary steps to overcome discriminatory conditions. Moreover, a self-evaluation
procedure is delineated. 45 C.F.R. § 84.6 (1977).
303. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,295 (1978) (to be codified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.703).
304. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,294 (1978).
305. See 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A(18) (1977).
306. Id. § 84.14; 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,296 (1978) (to be codified in 5 C.F.R. 713.706).
The § 503 regulation appears to allow such inquiry but only if it is deemed nondiscrimina-
tory. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(3) (1977).
307. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(c) (1977). Slight variations exist in the §501 & 503 regulations.
See 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,296 (1978) (to be codified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.706(b)); 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-741.6(c)(3) (1977).
308. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(d) (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 12,293, 12,296 (1978) (to be codified in 5
C.F.R. § 713.706(c)); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(3) (1977). Supervisors, safety personnel and
government inspectors are generally excepted. Id.
309. Transsexual individuals are often critically characterized as publicity seekers. Crit-
ics point to news stories about people as Dr. Renee Richards. Yet very few actually come to
public attention and, when they do, it is often as a result of litigation or, as with Dr. Rich-
ards, in an attempt to help other transsexual people by informing the public. See Constitu-
tionality of/he Chromosome Test, supra note 6, at 332 n.7. See also Money, Clarke & Mazur,
Families of Seven Male-to-Female Transexuals After 5-7 Years: Sociological Sexolog,, 4
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 187 (1975) (suggesting it is healthier for families to announce,
to their family and friends, the transsexual condition of a family member).
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closure. Dishonesty or relegation to other, perhaps less desirous, 310 oc-
cupations are the alternatives; neither choice is desirable for the
individual involved or for society.
State Protection for Handicapped Individuals
Today every state in the union has recognized the special employ-
ment needs of disabled persons even if manifested only in the forma-
tion of a governor's commission 31' to investigate and to promote
employment opportunities. To the aggrieved handicapped employee,
the usefulness of state statutory protections is variable. Some provi-
sions limit the scope of protection to physically handicapped persons
discriminated against by public employers, 312 others extend to discrimi-
nation by public and private employers.313 Still others, usually
amended fair employment statutes, embrace both physically and men-
tally disabled individuals in the private sector.314 A small number
cover the private sector but do not differentiate between physical and
mental handicaps.31 5
310. The failure of employers to hire or retain known transsexual people may force
them into professions where inquiries are not made, e.g., prostitution, or onto welfare. See
Levine, Gruenwald & Shaiova, Behavioral Dfferences and Emotional Conflict Among Male-
to-Female Transsexuals, 5 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 81, 83 (1975).
311. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 286.200 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Similar commissions operate in
other states, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Michigan. These
states, however, provide more substantive employment protection as well.
312. ALA. CODE tit. 21, § 21-7-8 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-492 (Supp. 1977)
(also includes mental impairment); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2901 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-34-801 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9501 (1974) (policy only); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-1504 (1973), § 1-320e (Supp. V 1977) (includes handicapped and homosexual citizens);
GA. CODE § 40-2201 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 56-707 (Supp. 1976); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-10
(1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-13-05 (1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 818 (1976); S.C. CODE § 43-33-60 (1976); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4419e § 3(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-28-3 (1976).
313. ALAS. STAT. § 18.80.220 (1974); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420 (West Supp. 1978); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1976); KAN. STAT. § 44-
1009 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 207-170 (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 24K
(West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 37.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 613.330 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7
(Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1976).
314. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65.23 (Smith-Hurd 1977), ch. 48, § 853 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(l)(a) (West 1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4571-
4572 (Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 49B § 19 (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.03(1) (West Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-301 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-1104 (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A: 8 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 4-33-7 (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.425(l) (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4131 (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.180 (Supp. 1977).
315. FLA. STAT ANN. § 13.261 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 24K
March 1979] EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
State statutes providing equal employment for handicapped per-
sons, like those of the federal government, contain no specific reference
to gender dysphoria. 316 Yet, in most cases a similar argument can be
made that transsexual individuals meet the definitional requirements of
the protected class.
Although statutes vary considerably, three general types of defini-
tions have been utilized by the states. First, physical and/or mental
disabilities have been defined in some detail with nonexclusive exam-
ples. 31 7 In this group, "physical handicap" typically means any physi-
cal disability or infirmity that is caused by injury, birth defect, or
illness. 318 Because gender dysphoria is a recognized illness, 31 9 if not
also a birth defect, 320 the application of these statutes to transsexualism
may hinge on an interpretation of the physical components of the dis-
order. Seemingly it would be difficult to ignore totally the physical
consequences of the condition-especially those resulting from rehabil-
itative treatment.321
The second type of definition may contain language similar to that
in the first group, but further requires medical documentation of the
disability.32 2 For the true transsexual individual this requirement
should be easily filled. In fact, it may prove beneficial in securing re-
(West Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.02(A) (Page Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (Purdon Supp. 1978); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 111.32 & 111.325 (West 1974).
316. Only two statutes appear to definitively preclude transsexualism from coverage.
ALA. CODE tit. 21, § 21-4-2 (1975) (nonambulatory, semiambulatory or aging); W. VA. CODE
§ 5-11-9 (Supp. 1978) (blindness only).
317. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-lf(b) (West Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B
§ 18(g) (Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-305(10), (13) (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(H) (Supp. 1977).
318. Physical handicap "means any physical disability, infirmity, malformation or dis-
figurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy, and
which shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physi-
cal coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness
or speech impediment or physical reliance on a seeing eye dog, wheelchair, or other reme-
dial appliance or device." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 1976).
319. See notes 14-29 & accompanying text supra.
320. See note 10 supra.
321. See note 12 supra.
322. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1(7) (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 207.130(2) (1977); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(7-A) (Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37-1103 (Supp. 1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(8) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney Supp.
1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(M) (Page Supp. 1977). At least two states have an
additional longterm requirement. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1(7) (1976) (throughout lifetime
without substantial improvement); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(M) (Page Supp. 1977)
(for considerable length of time). This may not affect the applicability of the statute to
gender dysphoric discriminatees. See note 278 & accompanying text supra.
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lief. Insofar as the judicial officer would be required to review a peti-
tioner's medical evidence, there would be little room for outdated
opinions.
Finally, there is a type of definition which is either circular or con-
clusory.323 It generally defines a "physical or mental handicap" as a
"handicap unrelated to one's ability to perform jobs or positions avail-
able to him for hire or promotion."324 Assuming that a transsexual
complainant was fully capable of performing a given job, the question
of his or her inclusion in the protected class would be dependent upon
the definition of "physical or mental handicap."
Vague or nonexistent 325 statutory definitions may be cured or cre-
ated by administrative guidelines. 326 Further, these guidelines may
narrow or expand the scope of an otherwise adequate statute.
For example, in California "physical handicap" is statutorily de-
fined to include "impairment of physical ability because of. . . loss of
function. ' 327 The applicability of this definition to gender dysphoric
individuals may find reinforcement in the California Fair Employment
Practice Commission's guidelines328 which closely follow the broad
federal definition of "physical" disability.329 Additionally, the commis-
sion has boldly expanded the California statute by adopting two other
categories of disability peculiar to the federal Rehabilitation
323. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-22 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(a)
(1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2(1 1) (West 1975); KAN. STAT. § 44-1002(j) (Supp. 1977);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(25) (West Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(13)
(Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-2K (1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.400 (1977); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(P) (Purdon Supp. 1978). For criticism of this type of definition, see
Potluck Protections, supra note 222, at 839-40.
324. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-22 (Smith-Hurd 1977). No definition is provided for
the other Illinois equal employment statute. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 853 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978).
325. The following states omit a definition of handicapped from their statutory provi-
sions: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Massachu-
setts, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
326. The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission Guidelines give a broad defi-
nition of physical and mental handicap similar to the federal regulation implementing § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT BASED UPON
PHYSICAL OR MENTAL HANDICAP UNRELATED TO ABILITY § 3.2(A), (B) (1976); see Potluck
Protections, supra note 222, at 841 n.164.
327. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1413(h) (West Supp. 1978).
328. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON PHYSICAL HANDICAP, FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
GUIDELINES § 520(c).
329. Loss of function "includes any physiological disorder or condition ... affecting
one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal. . . reproductive
.. . genito-urinary... skin, and endocrine." Id. See notes 272-74 & accompanying text
supra.
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Act33 0 -"[h]aving a record of a physical handicap" 331 and "[b]eing re-
garded as having a physical handicap. 332
In any event, state statutes generally add little protection to that
afforded by the comprehensive federal scheme. They become impor-
tant to a handicapped petitioner mainly when the Rehabilitation Act is
rendered inapplicable because a private employer has no dealings with
the federal government.333 Even then, many states offer no relief for
injuries suffered in the private sector.334 For this reason, the amend-
ment of Title VII to protect handicapped persons from private discrim-
ination has been urged repeatedly and meritoriously.335
Conclusion
As a result of recent scientific investigation, steady advances have
been made in defining gender dysphoria syndrome, isolating the needs
of afflicted individuals, and providing treatment. The syndrome is now
a recognized medical entity which frequently is treated, of necessity, by
potentially lifesaving sex-reassignment surgery and concomitant thera-
pies. In several contexts, the courts have been asked to keep pace with
this medical progress. Some legislation and judicial decisions have be-
gun to restrain the negative assumptions about gender dysphoria, and
those who suffer from it, that have formed the foundation of discrimi-
natory private and state action.
These medical and legal definitions, however, have been applied
unevenly by courts considering the right of transsexual persons to pro-
tection against employment discrimination. In Voyles and Holloway,
the Ninth Circuit, following the first impression district court decisions
in the Voyles and Grossman cases, summarily has denied Title VII cov-
erage to gender dysphoric individuals discriminated against by private
employers. Reasoning that such cases reflect discrimination on the ba-
sis of "change of sex" rather than "sex" itself, the courts have placed a
Draconian gloss on the otherwise expansive federal legislation. Had
the surgical treatment been properly understood as a rehabilitative pro-
cedure by which the gender dysphoric individual's true gender identity
330. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976).
331. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON PHYSICAL HANDICAP, FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
GUIDELINES § 521(D).
332. Id. § 521(E). At the same tirre, however, the guidelines specifically eliminate from
the protected class mentally retarded, mentally ill, alcoholic and drug addicted individuals.
333. See notes 248-64 & accompanying text supra.
334. See notes 311-12 supra.
335. See Wright, supra note 222, at 65 n.2; Equal Employment, supra note 216, at 459;
Potluck Protections, supra note 218, at 834-35.
[Vol. 30
has evolved-rather than a fabricated choice of whim or fancy-the
court might have found the requisite "sex" basis. In this way the prac-
tical and philisophical difficulties inherent in a reinterpretation of ex-
isting law or legislative amendment would have been obviated.
Should the judiciary fail to reconsider these decisions in light of
recent medical and legal definitions, and assuming no major legislative
revisions, transsexual discriminatees must look elsewhere for employ-
ment protection. Victims of exclusionary government provisions, such
as military or public teaching regulations, appear to have a strong con-
stitutional argument based on equal protection and due process. In ad-
dition, application of the employment safeguards of the federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and their state counterparts, augurs at least
an entry to the judicial system for gender dysphoric persons discrimi-
nated against by private employers.
Lest there be concern that discrimination against transsexual per-
sons would be inconsistently deemed, at once, discrimination because
of sex and discrimination because of disability, it should be
remembered that many discriminatory acts are predicated on multiple
prejudices. For example, a member of an ethnic minority who also has
a medical condition may be denied employment, terminated, or held
back on the basis of both race and disability. The case for double-
edged discrimination is even stronger with a gender dysphoric individ-
ual, as it is for those who suffer from other gender linked conditions
such as hermaphroditism or Turner's syndrome; the "sex" of such per-
sons cannot be separated from the handicapping medical condition
whereas race and disability are distinct and potentially separable
characteristics.
This Article urges the judiciary to abandon dated assumptions
about the gender dysphoric minority group in favor of a more reasoned
approach to employment protection. Yet, it stresses that such an ap-
proach is consonant with legislative intent and the legitimate concern
of employers for their economic enterprise. Employers would be able
to defend discriminatory conduct in the same manner that other dis-
criminations are justified-to wit, by establishing the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification, business necessity, or other recognized defense.
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